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Abstract 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature has documented that targets’ higher corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) rating leads to a higher premium paid by acquirers. Using a U.S. domestic 
sample between 1996 and 2014, we examine how this relationship differs between religious and 
non-religious acquirer managers. We find that the positive association between target CSR and 
premium is stronger for acquirers headquartered in highly religious counties, and such acquirers 
pay a lower premium to targets that have more CSR concerns. The results suggest that religious 
managers, due to their more risk-averse personality, are more conscious with targets’ misbehaviors 
on CSR. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
During the last two decades, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has given rise to vast studies 
that investigate its role in finance. Meanwhile, the question of how religion affects firm decisions 
has drawn increasing attention from the behavioral finance area.1 In this study, we link the two 
subjects to investigate how they can jointly affect merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. 
Specifically, we argue that religious managers, due to their different risk perception, are more 
conscious with target firms’ CSR performance, especially their misbehaviors on CSR.  
Previous studies have shown that the M&A premium paid by an acquirer is positively associated 
with the target’s CSR performance (Choi et al., 2015; Gomes & Marsat, 2018; Malik, 2014). One 
explanation proposed by researchers is that, unlike shareholders who are mainly concerned with 
systematic risk, acquirers are more risk-averse in M&A because of their less diversified positions, 
and they are more conscious with targets’ CSR, which is associated with the firms’ idiosyncratic 
risks (Godfrey et al., 2009; Jo & Na, 2012; Sharfman & Fernando, 2008). Therefore, acquirers pay 
a higher premium to high CSR targets for their interests in risk-diversification and a lower 
premium to low CSR targets for potential risks implied by the CSR ratings. Following this theory, 
we hypothesize that the positive association between target CSR and M&A premium depends on 
the acquirer managers’ risk perception, in the sense that more risk-averse acquirer managers are 
more concerned with targets’ CSR performance, and thus, they are more likely to pay a higher 
(lower) premium to high (low) CSR targets. As researchers have found an inverse association 
between religiosity and risk-taking (Hilary & Hui, 2009), we argue that the positive association 
between target CSR and premium is more pronounced for the acquirer managers who are religious. 
As a firm can be both corporate socially responsible and irresponsible (Strike et al., 2006), we 
decompose targets’ CSR ratings into strengths scores (i.e., the positive aspect of CSR) and 
concerns scores (i.e., the negative aspect of CSR) to see how their associations with premium differ 
between religious and non-religious acquirer managers. Since studies have reported that firms 
headquartered in highly religious counties in the U.S. engage less in positive CSR activities 
(McGuire et al., 2012) and they tend to pay less M&A premium (Xin, 2014), we argue that for 
such acquirers, the positive association between target CSR and premium is primarily driven by 
 
1 Most of the finance studies on religion are based on the psychological finding that religion increases one’s risk 
aversion and leads to more ethical judgments (Dehejia et al., 2005; Miller & Hoffmann, 1995; Zahn, 1970). 
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targets’ CSR concerns. In other words, while these acquirers do not pay additional premium for 
targets’ CSR strengths, they pay a lower premium for targets’ CSR concerns.  
Our tests are based on a sample of 467 domestic deals in the U.S. announced between 1996 and 
2014. Focusing on M&A in one single country reduces the risk of omitted variables, as in a cross-
border scenario we would need to control for too many variables such as national culture, legal 
systems, and public infrastructure, and might not have enough degree of freedom to conduct a 
powerful test (Hilary & Hui, 2009). Also, the U.S. sample is advantageous as the level of religious 
practice in the U.S. is relatively high and the socio-economic development among different regions 
is similar (Hilary & Hui, 2009). Following previous studies, we use county-level religiosity as a 
proxy for acquirer managers’ religiosity. We collect the M&A data from SDC Platinum, the CSR 
data from MSCI (formerly KLD and GMI), and the county-level religiosity data from American 
Religion Data Archive (ARDA). 
Since our interest is to see how one effect (i.e., the effect of target CSR on M&A premium) depends 
on the other effect (i.e., acquirer managers’ religiosity), we run OLS regressions to test how the 
interaction of acquirer managers’ religiosity and target CSR rating affects M&A premium. 
However, the interaction term would lead to severe multicollinearity issue if we simply multiply 
the two continuous variables together. Therefore, we construct a dummy variable to measure 
religiosity: we define an acquirer is headquartered in a religious county (or the acquirer managers 
are religious) if the county-level religiosity falls into the fourth quartile of our sample, and we 
interact the dummy variable with various measures of target CSR.   
Our results show that the positive association between target CSR and M&A premium is stronger 
for religious acquirer managers, and such managers pay a lower premium to targets that have more 
CSR concerns. The interaction between targets’ net CSR score and the religiosity dummy is 
positively associated with M&A premium, but neither CSR score nor the religiosity dummy is 
consistently significant, suggesting that acquirers headquartered in highly religious counties are 
more sensitive to targets’ CSR performance. When decomposing target CSR ratings into strengths 
scores and concerns scores, we find that the interaction between concerns score and the religiosity 
dummy is negatively associated with premium but no evidence for strengths score, supporting our 
argument that religious acquirer managers are more careful with targets’ CSR concerns because 
of the potential risks associated. The results hold after we have controlled for deal characteristics, 
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firm characteristics, year fixed effect, and industry fixed effect, and they remain robust in several 
tests, in which we use a different measure of M&A premium and a series of other controls. 
Our study makes the following contributions to the literature. First, although many researchers 
have studied the effect of religion on firm decisions in a direct way (Grullon et al., 2009; Hilary & 
Hui, 2009; McGuire et al., 2011; McGuire et al., 2012), only a few has investigated how such 
effect takes place through interacting with other factors such as CSR.2 Hence, we help to introduce 
a new area for future studies to explore. Second, our paper belongs to a handful of studies that look 
into the impact of religion on M&A events (Chen et al., 2017; Chintrakarn et al., 2016; Xin, 2014), 
and we show that M&A premium is affected by the non-economic factor, which should be 
incorporated by future studies. Third, our study complements other studies and helps to explain 
their findings such as acquirers located in more religious areas are less likely to receive a negative 
announcement return (Chintrakarn et al., 2016) and acquirers located in more religious counties 
pay less takeover premium (Xin, 2014). Fourth, as a part of the growing literature about religion, 
we confirm previous findings that religion increases managers’ risk aversion and influences firm 
decisions.   
The remainder of this paper is designed as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature review and 
our hypothesises. Chapter 3 provides details on the sample and research design. Chapter 4 contains 
our finding and the results of robustness check. Chapter 5 presents the conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 As far as we know, only Cui et al. (2017) take a similar approach and find the negative CSR – firm risk association is 
more pronounced for firms headquartered in more religious counties. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In this chapter, we review previous studies on the interrelationship among CSR, religion, and 
M&A, from which we develop our research questions and hypothesises.  
2.1 CSR and Firm Performance 
The concept of CSR arguably originates from the stakeholder theory, which states that a firm has 
certain responsibilities to the society, and it should not only pursue the wealth of its shareholders, 
but also care the benefits of other stakeholders. Based on this theory, CSR refers to a firm’s various 
voluntary initiatives toward its different stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, regulators, 
employees, and communities (Malik, 2015). 
An immense amount of studies has investigated whether CSR increases firm value, but a debate 
remains. The benefits of CSR have been well documented in various business literatures. For 
example, CSR generates trust with consumers and increases profits (Fisman et al., 2006); CSR 
increases employee commitment (Kim et al., 2010); CSR promotes a better relationship with 
regulators (Freedman & Stagliano, 1991). Although some scholars argue that the effect of CSR on 
a firm’s performance exists in a contingent manner (Clacher & Hagendorff, 2012; Smith et al., 
2010; Wang et al., 2011), the majority of previous research suggests that CSR is positively 
associated with firm performance (Malik, 2015; Margolis et al., 2009), which is reflected by 
operating performance measured by return on investment and return on assets and stock market 
performance measured by stock returns and market to book (Anderson & Frankel, 1980; Cochran 
& Wood, 1984; Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996; Nehrt, 1996).  
CSR also affects firms’ idiosyncratic risks. Researchers have reported that CSR activities reduce 
not only social risks but also operational, financial, and litigation-related risks (Chih et al., 2008; 
Jo & Na, 2012; Kim et al., 2012; Starks, 2009). A firm’s CSR engagement can reduce the 
probabilities of expected financial, social, or environmental crisis (Sharfman & Fernando, 2008) 
and generate moral capital or goodwill, which provides “insurance-like” protection (Godfrey et 
al., 2009),3 while underinvestment on CSR may expose a firm to more potential risks. Most 
empirical studies find an inverse association between CSR and firm risk (Jo & Na, 2012). 
 
3 Godfrey et al. (2009) show that in an adverse event, shareholders of high CSR firms suffer less because of the 
goodwill generated by CSR activities. 
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Consistently, high CSR firms tend to have a lower debt-financing cost (Goss & Roberts, 2011; Ye 
& Zhang, 2011) and a lower equity-financing cost (Dhaliwal et al., 2011).  
Some scholars argue that CSR activities can also bring economic disadvantages to the firms. For 
example, Griffin and Mahon (1997) show that spending in CSR can negatively affect the firm’s 
performance; Bird and Smucker (2007) find that managers who hold a broader conception of CSR 
can make decisions that damage the shareholders’ benefits; Barnea and Rubin (2010) argue that 
CSR can induce agency problem as managers may invest CSR for their personal interests. 
However, regarding the findings of a negative association or no clear association between CSR 
and firm performance, some researchers suggest that econometric issues and different definitions 
of CSR are the main reasons (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Taneja et al., 
2011).  
2.2 The Role of CSR in M&A 
Previous studies have shown that both acquirer CSR and target CSR have a significant impact on 
M&A events. One group of studies focus on how CSR affects the result of M&A. Aktas et al. 
(2011) find a positive association between the acquirer’s stock performance and the target’s CSR 
rating during the M&A announcement. They also find that acquirer firms improve their CSR 
performance following the acquisitions of targets with high CSR ratings, suggesting that CSR 
experience can be transferred through M&A. Deng et al. (2013) compare the performance of high 
CSR acquirers and that of low CSR acquirers, and find that high CSR acquirers tend to realize 
higher abnormal returns during the M&A announcement period and positive long-term returns 
after the M&A, showing that the acquirer’s CSR performance is an important determinant of the 
acquirer’s gain from M&A. Choi and Kim (2018) look into how the target’s CSR practice gets 
changed by the acquirer’s managers in the post-M&A period, and they find while the acquirer 
managers tend to maintain the target’s superior CSR related to environment and product, they 
prefer to dismiss the CSR of other dimensions, suggesting that in M&A acquirers pay selective 
attention to targets’ CSR performance. 
The other group of studies instead investigate how CSR affects M&A decisions. Hawn (2013) 
shows that in cross-border transactions an acquirer’s positive CSR rating leads to faster deal 
completion, and thus reduces home country disadvantages. Krishnamurti et al. (2017) find that 
firms with high CSR ratings participate M&A less frequently, and if they undertake M&A, they 
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pay less premium on average. They link this finding to the Overconfidence Theory and argue that 
CEOs’ overconfidence leads to less investment in CSR but more in empire-building, which is 
reflected by the high premium paid to targets. Through examining manufacturing firms’ 
environmental performance, Berchicci et al. (2012) find that high CSR acquirers are more likely 
to acquire low CSR targets. However, with the data of Australian firms, Krishnamurti et al. (2018) 
find that high CSR firms are more likely to acquire firms with CSR activities, and they tend to pay 
less premium. They conclude that high CSR firms make decisions aligned with the shareholders’ 
wealth-maximization objective.  
Three studies have explicitly examined how targets’ CSR performance affects M&A premium. 
Using a U.S. domestic M&A sample, Malik (2014) shows that a higher target’s CSR rating, which 
is filed by MSCI (formerly KLD and GMI), is associated with a higher premium paid by the 
acquirer. Besides, she tests each dimension of CSR separately, and finds that different dimensions 
are associated with M&A premium differently: environmental performance has the strongest 
positive association; community and diversity have weakly positive associations; product has no 
association; employee relationship has a negative association.4 Additionally, she finds that 
acquirers’ response to targets’ CSR concerns is stronger than that of targets’ CSR strengths. Also 
using the MSCI data, Choi et al. (2015) find similar evidence by examining cash-only transactions. 
They link their finding to the signaling theory and argue that a target’s CSR rating sends a signal 
about the firm’s overall quality to the acquirer. With a different CSR measure, Gomes and Marsat 
(2018) find that while targets’ environmental performance is valuated by both domestic and 
foreign acquirers, targets’ social performance is only valuated by foreign acquirers. 
2.3 The Impact of Religion on Firm Decisions 
The research on how religion affects corporate decisions is inspired by psychology and sociology 
studies that analyze the influence of religion on individuals. These works generally suggest that 
religious belief leads to more ethical judgments as it takes a series of social norms as guidance for 
one’s life (Longenecker et al., 2004; Parboteeah et al., 2008; Zahn, 1970), or that religious 
individuals tend to have a higher level of risk aversion (Dehejia et al., 2005; Miller & Hoffmann, 
1995; Osoba, 2003).   
 
4 Malik (2014) summarizes the details on MSCI ESG rating definition (pp. 144 – 159). 
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Hilary and Hui (2009) firstly extend the study of religion to the area of corporate finance. They 
find that firms headquartered in more religious counties in the U.S. display less volatility of stock 
returns and less volatility of returns on asset, and such firms tend to have less investments and less 
R&D activities. They interpret the result as the evidence that religion increases managers’ risk-
aversion and reduces firms’ risk exposure. Following them, many scholars have examined the 
impact of religion on firm decisions from different angles.  
One group of researchers find further evidence that religion reduces firms’ risk-taking. Shu et al. 
(2012) show that local religiosity affects mutual funds’ risk-taking and funds located in high-
protestant areas exhibit less return volatility. Gao et al. (2017) find that hedge funds located in 
more religious counties display less total volatility and less idiosyncratic volatility, and such funds 
hold less risky stocks and more diversified portfolios. El Ghoul et al. (2012) find that firms located 
in more religious counties enjoy cheaper equity financing costs, and the effect is larger for firms 
with lower institutional ownership. Callen and Fang (2015) find that the financial crisis was less 
severe in areas with high religiosity and firms in those areas tend to have more timely and reliable 
disclosure of information, which reduces potential legal risks. Using a sample of family firms in 
China, Jiang et al. (2015) show that firms founded by religious entrepreneurs have lower leverage 
and less investment compared to those founded by non-religious entrepreneurs. Interestingly, their 
finding mainly holds for entrepreneurs who adhere to western religions but not eastern religions. 
Meanwhile, other researchers find that religion also deters unethical corporate behaviors. Grullon 
et al. (2009) find that firms headquartered in highly religious counties are less likely to backdate 
options, grant excessive manager compensations, and be the target of class action securities 
lawsuits. McGuire et al. (2011) report that firms located in more religious areas engage less in 
financial reporting irregularities and more in real earning management.  
Since the data of managers’ personal religiosity is not available, one methodology commonly 
adopted by these studies is using county-level religiosity as a proxy. Hilary and Hui (2009) 
introduce a ratio of the total number of religious adherents divided by the total population of the 
county where the firm is headquartered. They argue that because local religiosity affects a firm’s 
organizational culture through the local employees’ participation and most of decision-makings 
take place at the firm’s headquarter, naturally the local religiosity would affect the firm’s decision-
makings to a certain degree. This argument is supported by the sociological finding that local 
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customs and attitudes have a powerful influence on human behavior (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; 
Kennedy & Lawton, 1998; Sunstein, 1996). Consistent with their assumption, Hilary and Hui 
(2009) show that CEOs are more likely to join a firm with a similar religious environment as in 
their previous firm when they switch employers.  
Concerning religion’s influence on individuals’ attitude towards CSR, Brammer et al. (2007) find 
that religious individuals do not prioritize CSR differently, but they hold a broader conception for 
CSR than non-religious individuals do. In terms of religion’s effect on firms’ CSR practices, 
McGuire et al. (2012) find that firms located in highly religious counties in the U.S. receive lower 
CSR ratings. In particular, these firms are associated with lower CSR strengths scores, suggesting 
that such firms engage less in positive CSR activities. Given the result, they argue that religious 
managers are able to separate their view of personal responsibility from their view of corporate 
responsibility, and therefore, their belief about CSR is not manifested by the firm decisions. 
Another explanation they propose is that religious managers might discard some progressive CSR 
initiatives that conflict with their religious norms, especially on diversity and employee 
relationship. Consistently, Griffin and Sun (2013) find that firms located in more religious areas 
have less voluntary CSR disclosure. Furthermore, Cui et al. (2017) document that the inverse 
association between CSR and firm risk is more pronounced for firms headquartered in religious 
counties in the U.S., and they argue that managers of firms in religious communities are more 
committed to CSR.  
A growing number of studies have investigated how religion affects M&A. Chintrakarn et al. 
(2016) show that firms located in more religious areas are less likely to receive a negative market 
reaction during their M&A announcements, and they argue that religion discourages managers 
from participating in value-destroying acquisitions. Following them, Chen et al. (2017) investigate 
how such effect varies with different religious denominations, and they find that progressive 
religious denominations are associated with higher acquirers’ announcement return and larger total 
synergy, but conservative religious denominations affect neither. Xin (2014) examines how 
county-level religiosity affects M&A premium and finds that acquirers located in more religious 
counties pay less premium and they tend to use all-cash offers. The study concludes that as religion 
discourages risk-takings, managerial opportunistic behaviors, and empire-building tendency, 
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religious managers pay a lower premium to reduce the likelihood of a negative return from the 
M&A deal. 
2.4 Hypothesis Development  
Regarding the positive association between target CSR and premium, in general, there are two 
explanations. The first one is based on the value-enhancing capacity of CSR. Acquirers pay more 
to high CSR targets because the target’s superior CSR practice can enhance the synergy created 
through M&A. As such, low CSR acquirers may be willing to pay more to high CSR targets in 
order to increase their CSR ratings or transfer the CSR experience (Malik, 2014). The second 
explanation is related to firm risks. Unlike shareholders who are mainly concerned with systematic 
risk, acquirers are largely concerned with targets’ specific risks, as their risk-reduction options are 
limited and costly but they must assume a large amount of specific risk because of investment 
concentration and the high costs associated with divestiture of acquired business (Gomes, 2018; 
Gomes & Marsat, 2018; Malik, 2014). Since CSR is associated with firms’ idiosyncratic risks, an 
acquirer may pay additional premium to a high CSR target for its interest in risk-diversification 
and a lower premium to a low CSR target for potential risks implied by the target’s CSR rating.  
Finance literature has documented that firms’ decision-makings are affected by managers’ risk 
perception, which comes from not only compensation incentives but also managers’ inherent 
personality (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Cain & Mckeon, 2016; May, 1995; Pablo et al., 1996). Linking 
the second explanation of the positive CSR – M&A premium association to the idea that managers’ 
risk perception is an important determinant of firms’ decision-making, we hypothesize that more 
risk-averse acquirer managers are more sensitive to targets’ risks and therefore, they are more 
likely to pay a higher premium to high CSR targets and a lower premium to low CSR targets. As 
there is a positive association between religiosity and risk-aversion, we argue that the positive 
association between target CSR and premium is more pronounced for the acquirer managers who 
are religious. Using county-level religiosity as a proxy for managers’ religiosity, we develop the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: The positive association between target CSR and M&A premium is stronger for acquirers 
headquartered in highly religious counties.  
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While we argue that the positive association between target CSR and premium is stronger for 
religious acquirer managers, the reason for this can be either they pay a higher premium for targets’ 
CSR strengths (i.e., the positive aspect of CSR practice) or they pay a lower premium for targets’ 
CSR concerns (i.e., the negative aspect of CSR practice), as a firm’s CSR rating can be expressed 
as following: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑆𝑅 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒   (2.1) 
Minor and Morgan (2011) point out that a firm’s CSR performance consists two parts, visible 
“doing good” activities and invisible “not doing harm” activities. A firm can improve its CSR 
performance by participating either “doing good” activities or “not doing harm” activities. Based 
on the above equation, “doing good” activities increase the strengths score and “not doing harm” 
activities decrease the concerns score. Previous studies have showed that a firm can be both 
socially responsible and irresponsible (Strike et al., 2006), implying that a high strengths score is 
not necessarily associated with a low concerns score, and vice versa. The reason for this is that 
CSR has various dimensions, and a firm can do well in one dimension while do badly in another 
dimension. Moreover, even for the same dimension, a firm can have a high strength score and a 
high concern score at the same time. For example, a firm might have a high environmental strength 
score because of recycling and adopting clean energy but also have a high environmental concern 
score due to an oil leak accident.   
Previous studies have shown that compared to the strength score, the concern score has a stronger 
impact on M&A premium (Choi et al., 2015; Malik 2014), and we hypothesize this tendency is 
particularly strong for religious acquirer managers. Considering the findings that religious 
individuals do not prioritize CSR differently (Brammer et al., 2007), that firms located in highly 
religious areas engage less in positive CSR activities (Griffin & Sun, 2013; McGuire et al., 2012), 
and that acquirers headquartered in more religious counties pay less M&A premium (Xin, 2014), 
we argue that hypothesis 1 is driven by the effect of CSR concerns, which is more related to firms’ 
potential risks. Therefore, we develop the following two hypothesises: 
H2a: Acquirers headquartered in highly religious counties do not pay a higher premium for 
targets’ CSR strengths. 
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H2b: Acquirers headquartered in highly religious counties pay a lower premium for targets’ CSR 
concerns. 
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Chapter 3: Data and Research Design 
3.1 Data Selection 
We obtain the M&A data from SDC Platinum, a database that has been widely used in M&A 
literature. We restrict our sample to the U.S. domestic deals, as it helps to reduce the probability 
of omitted variable biases, which can be caused by national culture or legal systems in a cross-
border M&A setting (Hilary & Hui, 2009). Following previous studies, we impose the following 
criterions for the data selection: the deal is announced between Jan 1st, 1992 and Dec 31st, 2014; 
the deal value is at least one million; the deal is completed; both the acquirer and the target are 
public firms; the acquirer gets the control over the target after the deal (shares owned after the deal 
is higher than fifty percent). With such criterions, we retrieve 5612 M&A deals.  
Next, we collect targets’ CSR data from MSCI (formerly KLD and GMI), a database that has been 
used by many studies (Chand & Fraser, 2006; Sharfman, 1996; Waddock & Graves, 1997). MSCI 
categorizes a firm’s CSR into seven dimensions: environment, community, diversity, product, 
employee relationship, human rights, and corporate governance. Each dimension is assigned with 
a strength score and a concern score. Following the argument that corporate governance does not 
belong to the concept of CSR (Gomes & Marsat, 2018; Malik, 2014), we exclude corporate 
governance, and use the other six dimensions for our test. Also, we use one-year lagged data to 
measure targets’ pre-M&A CSR performance.5 After getting matched with the CSR data, the 
sample size decreases to 747. The significant reduction of sample size is consistent with those 
reported by Malik (2014) and Choi et al. (2015). Since the scores are not comparable among 
different years, we rescale them for the year effect. That is, we divide the strength and concern 
score for each dimension by the respective maximum value of that year, so the total score of each 
dimension becomes one. We sum up a firm’s strength (concern) scores for the six dimensions to 
get the total strengths (concerns) score and calculate the net CSR score by subtracting the total 
concerns score from the total strengths score.  
Then, we drop the observations with negative M&A premium in percentage. Weitzel and Kling 
(2012) argue that different from positive premium, negative premium is usually caused by target 
 
5 We use the data for 1995 – 2013. The strength/concern scores filed by MSCI is available for 1991 – 2013. Because 
the CUSIP code is not reported for 1991 - 1994, we start with 1995. The 1995 cutoff is also used by Choi et al. (2015), 
and the 2013 cutoff is also used by Cui et al. (2017). 
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overvaluation, market liquidity, or “hidden earnouts.6” Therefore, dropping the negative premium 
reduces the disturbances from these situations. We also drop the observation if the premium is 
missing. After the two steps, the sample size decreases to 671. 
We retrieve the religiosity data from the American Religion Data Archive (ARDA) and calculate 
county-level religiosity as the ratio of the number of religious adherents in the county to the 
population of the county.7 Since the data is reported every ten years (i.e., 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010), 
following Hilary and Hui (2009), we linearly interpolate the data to obtain the values for the 
missing years.8 We match the M&A sample, which includes the zip codes of the acquirers’ 
headquarters, with the FIPS county codes, and then match them with the religiosity data by using 
the FIPS county codes. During this process, we lose 9 observations due to missing values of zip 
codes or county codes.  
Finally, we exclude financial and utility industries from the sample as such industries are highly 
leveraged or highly regulated. Our final sample consists of 467 deals made by 348 acquirer firms, 
which are headquartered in 185 counties. Table 3.1 summarizes the sample selection procedure 
and presents a comparison with the studies of Malik (2014) and Choi et al. (2015). The year 
distribution and the industry distribution (at one-digit SIC-code level) of the sample can be found 
in Appendix A.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 It refers to the fact that target shareholders benefit from a favorable share exchange ratio or the synergy realization 
when the acquirer pays by stock. 
7 The “Churches and Church Membership” files on ARDA provide information on the number of members of each 
church in every county. 
8 We use the 2000 survey results for 1996 – 2005 and the 2010 survey results for 2006 – 2014. 
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Table 3.1: Sample Construction and a Comparison with Other Studies 
The table presents the sample construction procedure for this study. It also presents a comparison with the studies of 
Malik (2014) and Choi et al. (2015), who also use the M&A data from SDC platinum and the CSR data from MSCI 
(formerly KLD and GMI). 
  Our Study Malik (2014) Choi et al. (2015) 
Number of deals 
retrieved from SDC 
5612 5932 - 
Match with CSR 
data from MSCI 
747 558 615 
Drop due to 
negative premium 
692 - - 
Drop due to 
unavailability of 
premium 
671 - - 
Match with county 
religiosity data 
662 - - 
Match with control 
variables 
- 419 - 
Drop financial and 
utility industries 
467 323 426 
 
3.2 Research Design  
Following the literature (Hambrick & Hayward, 1997; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998), we define M&A 
premium as the purchase price paid by the acquirer minus the target’s stock price, divided by the 
target’s stock price. Although the purchase price is usually revealed on the deal-announcement 
date, most studies use the target’s pre-announcement stock price to reduce the chance that the stock 
price gets contaminated by the M&A news. For example, Malik (2014) uses the stock price 30 
days prior to the announcement and Choi et al. (2015) use the stock price one week prior to the 
announcement. For the main tests, we use the premium calculated by the stock price one week 
prior to the announcement, and for robustness check, we test a four-week premium. Also, 
following Rossi and Volpin (2004), we use the natural logarithm form of the premium in 
percentage. Mathematically, the dependant variable is expressed as following:  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = ln(
𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡1 − 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡0
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡0
 × 100)   (3.1) 
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We construct three OLS regression models to test our hypothesises. Hypothesis 1 is tested by 
equation 3.2. Hypothesis 2a is tested by equation 3.3, and Hypothesis 2b is tested by equation 3.4. 
The main variables used in this study are defined in Appendix B. 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝐿 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝐿 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝑅 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠   (3.2) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝐿 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝑆 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠   (3.3) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝐿 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝐶 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠   (3.4) 
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics for all variables, and Table 3.3 presents the main 
variables’ sample average sorted by acquirer states. The sample mean of M&A premium in 
percentage is 40.3%, closed to the one reported by Choi et al. (2015), which is 40.53%. The 
negative mean of CSR (-0.28) is consistent with the average value of the whole MSCI data set.9 
To reduce the impact of outliers, we also winsorize the continuous variables at 1% level and 
conduct separate tests. 
Since we want to study how the effect of one variable (CSR) depends on the other variable 
(Religiosity), the interaction CSR * Religiosity is the main variable of interest. However, the 
interaction of two continuous variables would lead to severe multicollinearity issue, which will 
give erroneous inference. Therefore, we construct a dummy variable “REL” to capture the effect 
of religiosity. We define the acquirer is headquartered in a religious county (REL = 1) if the county-
level religiosity falls into the fourth quartile of the sample (i.e., Religiosity > 0.671272), and not 
in a religious county (REL = 0) otherwise. As such, the interaction REL*CSR is not highly 
correlated with either CSR or REL. Also, the correlation between Religiosity and REL is 0.72, 
indicating that REL is a good proxy for Religiosity. Likewise, we construct the other two 
interaction variables, REL*total strengths (REL*TS) and REL*total concerns (REL*TC), to test 
hypothesis 2a and 2b. The dummy variable REL divides the sample into 112 acquirers 
headquartered in religious counties (23.98% of the sample), with an average religiosity of 0.72, 
and 355 acquirers headquartered in non-religious counties (76.02% of the sample), with an average 
religiosity of 0.53. With all missing control variables dropped, there are 96 acquirers of religious
 
9 Based on our measure, the average CSR for the whole MSCI data set (obs. 37938) during 1995 – 2013 is -0.15.  
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 
The table presents the summary statistics of all variables used in this study. The primary dependent variable is M&A premium (one-week), which is the natural 
logarithm of M&A premium in percentage calculated by targets’ stock price one-week before the announcement. In our regressions, deal value and acquirer size 
are also adjusted with natural logarithm. The winsorizing is at 1% level. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Min (winsorized) Max (winsorized) 
M&A premium in percentage (one-week) 467 40.29 35.80 0.62 285.02   
M&A premium (one-week) 467 3.39 0.84 -0.48 5.65 0.63 5.43 
CSR (six dimensions) 467 -0.28 0.52 -1.98 1.87 -1.75 1.12 
TS (six dimensions) 467 0.18 0.32 0 1.87 0 1.53 
TC (six dimensions) 467 0.47 0.45 0 2.40 0 2.17 
Religiosity 467 0.58 0.11 0.29 0.94   
REL 467 0.24 0.43 0 1   
other bidder 467 0.06 0.25 0 1   
cash offer 467 0.44 0.50 0 1   
tender offer 467 0.22 0.42 0 1   
hostile bid 467 0.07 0.26 0 1   
toehold 467 0.02 0.14 0 1   
deal value in millions 467 4535.27 10198.48 14.2 89555.35   
deal value 467 7.33 1.41 2.65 11.40 4.36 10.99 
acquirer size 462 8.73 1.75 0.99 13.41 4.56 12.14 
acquirer FCF 461 0.15 0.14 -1.86 0.60 -0.18 0.44 
target m/b (one-week) 439 3.69 4.89 0.31 58.75 0.57 21.13 
target FCF 460 0.09 0.19 -1.61 0.51 -0.81 0.40 
target leverage 449 0.19 0.26 0 3.23 0 0.88 
target institutional 431 0.70 0.21 0.03 100.00 0.10 0.99 
CSR (four dimensions) 467 -0.21 0.43 -2.13 1.37   
TC (four dimensions) 467 0.33 0.36 0 2.13   
M&A premium in percentage (four-week) 467 44.70 39.35 0.03 301.46   
M&A premium (four-week) 467 3.50 0.86 -3.51 5.71   
target m/b (four-week) 439 3.56 4.53 0.24 52.5   
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ACSR 397 0.06 0.85 -2.89 2.91   
horizontal 467 0.66 0.47 0 1   
 
Table 3.3: Sample Average Sorted by Acquirer States 
The table presents the sample average of deal value (in millions), M&A premium in percentage (calculated by targets’ stock price one week before the 
announcement), religiosity, CSR (targets’ net CSR score), TS (targets’ total strengths score), and TC (targets’ total concerns score) for each state where acquirers 
are headquartered.  
State Number of Deals Percent Deal Value M&A Premium in Percentage Religiosity CSR TS TC 
Alabama 2 0.43 2939.74 38.11 0.65 -0.63 0.00 0.63 
Arkansas 6 1.28 2504.55 46.45 0.69 -0.33 0.11 0.44 
Arizona 8 1.71 5665.67 41.39 0.42 -0.42 0.23 0.64 
California 92 19.70 2919.50 39.59 0.46 -0.26 0.16 0.43 
Colorado 5 1.07 15573.51 36.80 0.50 0.31 0.53 0.21 
Connecticut 9 1.93 2764.67 30.55 0.69 -0.49 0.19 0.68 
District of Columbia 4 0.86 1468.44 43.73 0.62 -0.18 0.17 0.35 
Delaware 3 0.64 4211.55 70.14 0.55 0.02 0.31 0.29 
Florida 10 2.14 1388.03 26.18 0.47 -0.30 0.07 0.37 
Georgia 9 1.93 2892.47 43.54 0.60 -0.60 0.07 0.67 
Idaho 2 0.43 6377.13 32.92 0.48 -0.15 0.10 0.25 
Illinois 29 6.21 2779.44 44.04 0.60 -0.30 0.17 0.47 
Indiana 4 0.86 2428.02 24.09 0.48 -0.44 0.09 0.52 
Kansas 10 2.14 5669.47 28.82 0.62 -0.21 0.12 0.33 
Kentucky 3 0.64 1969.71 30.12 0.57 -0.56 0.13 0.69 
Louisiana 2 0.43 12670.48 26.28 0.70 -0.52 0.31 0.83 
Massachusetts 29 6.21 2785.75 35.32 0.65 -0.16 0.21 0.36 
Maryland 3 0.64 3365.13 24.78 0.53 -0.36 0.06 0.42 
Michigan 7 1.50 6523.80 49.01 0.54 -0.29 0.65 0.94 
Minnesota 12 2.57 1613.71 43.66 0.68 -0.25 0.11 0.36 
Missouri 8 1.71 4670.88 34.54 0.55 -0.39 0.27 0.66 
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Mississippi 1 0.21 41906.90 100.99 0.67 0.20 0.20 0.00 
North Carolina 8 1.71 2725.87 57.28 0.60 0.05 0.36 0.32 
Nebraska 2 0.43 2746.44 20.01 0.61 -0.46 0.25 0.71 
New Hampshire 1 0.21 2720.37 4.68 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Jersey 28 6.00 4147.13 40.45 0.64 -0.18 0.16 0.34 
Nevada 3 0.64 3350.97 29.30 0.37 -0.31 0.00 0.31 
New York 49 10.49 7931.66 51.38 0.63 -0.21 0.21 0.42 
Ohio 17 3.64 5338.58 47.31 0.56 -0.24 0.21 0.45 
Oklahoma 5 1.07 3773.05 25.66 0.81 -0.69 0.12 0.81 
Oregon 2 0.43 1554.78 28.63 0.34 -0.23 0.10 0.33 
Pennsylvania 12 2.57 1100.72 41.83 0.72 -0.50 0.04 0.54 
Rhode Island 3 0.64 9930.50 19.01 0.57 -0.19 0.14 0.33 
Tennessee 11 2.36 4394.11 56.91 0.64 -0.44 0.19 0.63 
Texas 55 11.78 7183.41 32.80 0.62 -0.31 0.24 0.55 
Virginia 8 1.71 3344.50 38.61 0.56 -0.72 0.06 0.78 
Washington 2 0.43 7095.22 74.27 0.41 -0.13 0.13 0.25 
Wisconsin 3 0.64 3610.12 33.44 0.61 -0.17 0.00 0.17 
Total 467 100       
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counties (25.33% of the sample), with an average religiosity of 0.72, and 283 acquirers of non-
religious counties (74.67% of the sample), with an average religiosity of 0.53.  
We control for year fixed effect for all OLS regressions, as it can resolve the disturbance from 
macro-economic factors that vary in different years. Also, it helps to alleviate the MSCI data’s 
selection bias in the early years (Jo & Na, 2012).10 In some regressions, we also control for 
acquirers’ or targets’ industry fixed effect (at one-digit SIC-code level) to get more robust results. 
Following the models used by Chatterjee et al. (2012) and Choi et al. (2015), we include two 
groups of control variables, deal characteristics and firm characteristics, to capture other factors 
that affect M&A premium. 
Controls for deal characteristics include other bidder (a dummy variable that equals to one if there 
was more than one bidder), cash offer (a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is paid 
entirely in cash), tender offer (a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is tender offer), 
hostile bid (a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is unsolicited), toehold (a dummy 
variable that equals to one if the target’s ownership held by the acquirer before the deal is more 
than 5%), and deal value (the natural logarithm of the transaction value in millions). All these 
variables are retrieved from SDC platinum. Table 3.2 shows that 6.4% of the sample have more 
than one bidder; 44.1% of the sample are cash offers; 22.5% of the sample are tender offers; 7.3% 
of the sample are hostile bid; 2.1% of the sample have toehold. Regarding toehold, Mantecon 
(2009) argues that acquirers that have stakes in the targets prior to the M&A have less information 
asymmetry, which affects the M&A premium. Deal value affects premium because acquirers have 
more information about large targets (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999) and the potential gain for 
acquirers can decrease as the target size increases (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002).  
For firm characteristics, we control for acquirers’ size (the natural logarithm of the firm’s total 
assets in millions one year prior to the announcement), acquirers’ free cash flow (EBITDA in 
millions divided by total assets in millions one year prior to the announcement), targets’ market-
to-book (stock price one week prior to the announcement divided by book value per share), targets’ 
free cash flow (EBITDA in millions divided by total assets in millions one year prior to the 
announcement), targets’ leverage (total long-term debt in millions divided by total assets in 
 
10 In the 1990s, firms in the KLD database include those in the S&P 500 and the Domini 400 Social Index, where 
selection for the latter was based on the KLD rating. 
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millions at the end of the year prior to the announcement year), and targets’ institutional ownership 
(percent of shares held by institutional investors three months before the announcement). We 
retrieve the data of targets’ leverage from COMPUSTAT, the data of targets’ institutional 
ownership from Thompson Reuters on WRDS, and the rest from SDC Platinum. Acquirers’ size 
and free cash flow are considered because large firms and firms with abundant cash are able to pay 
a higher premium. Targets’ market-to-book affects premium because acquirers may pay a higher 
premium to high m/b targets to capture their growth opportunity (Laamanen, 2007). Also, it is 
possible that acquirers pay a lower premium to high m/b targets because they have been overvalued 
by the market. Similarly, targets’ free cash flow affects premium as it reflects the target’s growth 
potential and financial condition. Targets’ leverage can affect premium because acquirers may be 
willing to pay more to low-leveraged targets to increase their debt capacity in the post-M&A period 
(Raad, 2012). Different from Choi et al. (2015), who calculate the leverage ratio as total lability 
over total assets, we use only the targets’ total long-term debt as the numerator because a large 
portion of the data for short-term liability is not available. Finally, we control for targets’ 
institutional ownership as Chatterjee et al. (2012) show that it can positively affect M&A premium. 
Table 3.4 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the main explanatory variables. Consistent 
with the finding of Xin (2014), the continuous measure of county-level religiosity is negatively 
correlated with M&A premium. However, different from our expectation, CSR is negatively 
correlated with premium, and TS is positively correlated with TC. The correlations among CSR, 
REL, and REL*CSR are acceptable, so are the correlations among TS, REL, and REL*TS and the 
correlations among TC, REL, and REL*TC. Overall, the correlations suggest that multicollinearity 
should not pose any problems.  
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Table 3.4: Pearson Correlation Table 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) M&A premium 1          
(2) CSR -0.02 1         
(3) TS -0.01 0.52*** 1        
(4) TC 0.02 -0.79*** 0.12*** 1       
(5) Religiosity -0.08* -0.04 -0.00 0.04 1      
(6) REL -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.72*** 1     
(7) REL*CSR 0.09* 0.49*** 0.22*** -0.40*** -0.34*** -0.44*** 1    
(8) REL*TS -0.04 0.21*** 0.44*** 0.07 0.30*** 0.43*** 0.20*** 1   
(9) REL*TC -0.10** -0.34*** 0.03 0.42*** 0.49*** 0.65*** -0.84*** 0.36*** 1  
(10) other bidder 0.11** -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 1 
(11) cash offer 0.08* -0.03 -0.18*** -0.10** -0.10** -0.07 0.01 -0.15*** -0.09** -0.11** 
(12) tender offer  0.20*** -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09* 0.02 -0.08* -0.06 0.09* 
(13) hostile bid 0.13*** -0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.05 0.10** 0.53*** 
(14) toehold 0.07 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 
(15) deal value -0.10** 0.08* 0.47*** 0.24*** 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.25*** 0.13*** 0.21*** 
(16) acquirer size 0.06 0.02 0.19*** 0.11** 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.09** 0.05 0.04 
(17) acquirer FCF 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.10** 0.08 -0.05 0.02 
(18) target m/b -0.12** 0.08* 0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.08* 0.06 -0.05 0.04 
(19) target FCF -0.19*** 0.02 0.11** 0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.00 0.09* 0.05 0.04 
(20) target leverage 0.05 -0.00 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 
(21) target institutional -0.21*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 
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  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(11) cash offer 1           
(12) tender offer  0.29*** 1          
(13) hostile bid -0.08* 0.20*** 1         
(14) toehold -0.04 -0.01 0.19*** 1        
(15) deal value -0.29*** -0.12** 0.17*** -0.03 1       
(16) acquirer size 0.21*** 0.09** 0.04 0.10** 0.49*** 1      
(17) acquirer FCF 0.13*** 0.10** -0.02 -0.00 0.14*** 0.21*** 1     
(18) target m/b -0.00 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.01 1    
(19) target FCF -0.03 -0.17*** 0.02 0.00 0.31*** 0.07 0.26*** 0.12*** 1   
(20) target leverage -0.21*** -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.03 -0.17*** -0.13*** 1  
(21) target institutional 0.06 -0.09* 0.01 -0.17*** 0.34*** 0.17*** 0.14*** -0.07 0.23*** 0.05 1 
 
***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 Main Results 
Table 4.1 presents the regression results for hypothesis 1. In column 1, we run a preliminary 
regression without the interaction variable. The result shows that CSR is not significantly 
associated with M&A premium, and more surprisingly, the sign of CSR is negative, contradicting 
to the previous finding that CSR is positively associated with premium. The different results can 
be attributed to the different dependent variables used, the different measures of CSR, and the 
different samples constructed. For instance, Malik (2014) uses the premium calculated by the stock 
price 30-days before the announcement, and she excludes human rights from her measure of CSR. 
Also, she includes financial and utility industries into her sample. Likewise, Choi et al. (2015) 
include corporate governance into their measure of CSR, not to mention that they only test pure-
cash transactions. Meanwhile, the estimation for county-level religiosity provides a weak support 
for the finding of Xin (2014), as Religiosity is negatively significant at 10% level.     
Table 4.1: Test on Hypothesis 1  
The table presents the result of seven OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A 
premium in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test 
variables are the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions including environment, 
community, diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; Religiosity, the religiosity of the county 
where the acquirer is headquartered; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if Religiosity is in the fourth quartile 
of the sample and zero otherwise; REL*CSR, the interaction between REL and CSR. Controls for deal characteristics 
are the following: other bidder, a dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero 
otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender 
offer, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the deal is unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
acquirer held more than 5% of the target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural 
logarithm of the transaction value in millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the 
natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by 
EBITDA divided by total assets; target m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one 
week before the announcement; target FCF, the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; 
target leverage, the target's total long-term debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held 
by institutional investors before the deal. We control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ 
industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) 
dummies for regression 7. F-test is for the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test 
on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CSR -0.015 -0.129 -0.108 -0.188** -0.132 -0.196** -0.199** 
 [-0.19] [-1.46] [-1.25] [-1.98] [-1.45] [-2.05] [-2.08] 
Religiosity -0.643*       
 [-1.70]       
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REL  0.079 0.088 0.021 0.043 0.046 0.037 
  [0.76] [0.87] [0.19] [0.42] [0.43] [0.34] 
REL*CSR  0.449*** 0.461*** 0.619*** 0.495*** 0.649*** 0.652*** 
  [2.66] [2.78] [3.50] [2.93] [3.66] [3.67] 
other bidder 0.066  0.163 -0.016 0.124 0.006 0.000 
 [0.31]  [0.86] [-0.08] [0.63] [0.03] [0.00] 
cash offer -0.028  0.076 -0.016 -0.010 -0.027 -0.027 
 [-0.25]  [0.88] [-0.15] [-0.10] [-0.25] [-0.24] 
tender offer 0.124  0.180* 0.138 0.146 0.132 0.142 
 [1.05]  [1.78] [1.19] [1.36] [1.11] [1.20] 
hostile 0.410*  0.380** 0.471** 0.438** 0.465** 0.448** 
 [1.96]  [2.07] [2.28] [2.34] [2.18] [2.12] 
toehold 0.084  0.273 0.106 0.221 0.095 0.075 
 [0.29]  [1.02] [0.37] [0.78] [0.33] [0.26] 
deal value -0.052  -0.067** -0.045 -0.077* -0.046 -0.052 
 [-1.10]  [-2.26] [-0.96] [-1.84] [-0.99] [-1.11] 
acquirer size 0.033   0.028 0.039 0.031 0.038 
 [1.00]   [0.87] [1.28] [0.94] [1.15] 
acquirer FCF 0.796**   0.683** 0.621* 0.685** 0.680** 
 [2.38]   [2.06] [1.96] [2.05] [2.04] 
target m/b -0.017*   -0.018* -0.018** -0.022** -0.022** 
 [-1.71]   [-1.90] [-2.23] [-2.19] [-2.21] 
target FCF -0.684**   -0.674** -0.842*** -0.580* -0.605* 
 [-2.10]   [-2.10] [-3.19] [-1.78] [-1.86] 
target leverage -0.025   0.004  0.191 0.179 
 [-0.09]   [0.01]  [0.71] [0.65] 
target institutional -0.741***   -0.749***  -0.824*** -0.800*** 
 [-2.94]   [-3.01]  [-3.27] [-3.16] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 379 467 467 379 430 379 379 
R-squared 0.117 0.016 0.072 0.146 0.121 0.167 0.165 
F-test 3.28*** 2.47* 3.76*** 3.93*** 4.23*** 3.08*** 3.03*** 
F-test (restriction)  4.83** 6.05** 8.17*** 6.31** 8.91*** 8.92*** 
 
In column 2-7, we add the interaction REL*CSR. The interaction is significant at 1% level in all 
regressions, providing strong evidence for hypothesis 1. In column 2, the result of the simple 
regression indicates that, in comparison to the acquirers of non-religious counties (REL = 0), the 
acquirers of religious counties (REL = 1) respond to target CSR more strongly. Mathematically, 
the impact of CSR on premium can be interpreted as following:  
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𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
𝜕𝐶𝑆𝑅
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝐿 = 0 + 0.45𝑅𝐸𝐿   (4.1) 
For an acquirer of religious counties, the impact of CSR on premium is captured by 𝛽1 + 𝛽3, and 
one-point increase of the target’s net CSR score is associated with 0.45-unit increase of premium. 
For an acquirer of non-religious counties, the impact of CSR on premium is captured by 𝛽1, and 
one-point increase of the target’s net CSR score is associated with no change of premium. Since 
both CSR and REL are insignificant, the result suggests that the premium paid by acquirers of 
religious counties is more positively associated with targets’ CSR rating. Also, the F-value of joint 
test shows that the model is jointly significant at 10 percent level.  
Since 𝛽1 is not significantly different from 0, to strengthen our argument, we conduct a linear 
restriction test to see whether 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 (which equals to 0.32 in column 2) is significantly different 
from 0. The F-value shows that we can reject the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0 at 5 percent 
level, providing further evidence that acquirers of religious counties value target CSR more 
strongly.  
In column 3, we add the controls for deal characteristics. REL*CSR is significant at 1% level, and 
neither CSR nor REL is significant. The result of the restriction test is also unchanged. Therefore, 
it shows that hypothesis 1 is not affected by the deal characteristics. As we include more controls, 
the model become jointly significant at 1% level. In column 4, same as column 1, we add all 
controls for firm characteristics. The number of used data decreases to 379 because of 
unavailability of data for some variables, especially target leverage and target institutional. The 
interaction is still significant at 1% level, indicating that hypothesis 1 is not affected by the firm 
characteristics. Compared to the model used in column 1, the model in column 4 gets improved 
with a stronger explaining power and a higher joint significance level, as the R-squared increases 
from 11.7% to 14.6% and the F-value increases from 3.283 to 3.927. In column 5, we drop target 
leverage and institutional ownership. The result presented in column 5 is like that of column 4, 
suggesting that the result in column 4 is not driven by the loss of data. To ensure that the result is 
not caused by certain industries, we control for the acquirer’s industry fixed effect in column 6 and 
the target’s industry fixed effect in column 7. The results remain unchanged.      
The estimation of CSR is opposed to previous studies, as it appears negatively associated with 
premium. In particular, column 4, 6, and 7 report a negative association at 5% significance level. 
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Although we are interested in whether different acquirers value target CSR differently, the variable 
CSR should not be used to infer how target CSR affects premium. For the purpose of comparison, 
we calculate the net CSR score as a sum of the six dimensions, but it is not reasonable to assume 
that in the real-world acquirers would treat these dimensions equally. The negative sign of CSR 
might be driven by the effect of some dimensions such as employee relationship and product, as 
Malik (2014) shows that employee relationship is negatively associated with premium and product 
has no effect on premium. For employee relationship, she argues that acquirers pay a lower 
premium to targets that have superior employee union relationship. Indeed, when we repeat the 
test by excluding the two dimensions, CSR is no longer significant. Table 4.2 presents the result.  
Table 4.2: Test on Hypothesis 1 by Excluding Employee Relationship and Product from CSR 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the four dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the religiosity of the county where the 
acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; REL*CSR, the interaction between 
REL and CSR. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a dummy variable that equals to one 
if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is tender offer 
and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is unsolicited and zero otherwise; 
toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of the target’s ownership before the 
deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in millions. Controls for firm 
characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets in millions; acquirer 
FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target m/b, the target’s market to 
book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, the target's free cash flow 
calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term debt divided by total assets; 
target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. We control for year fixed 
effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 5 and 
targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6. F-test is for the joint test on all regressors. F-
test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSR -0.067 -0.038 -0.063 -0.031 -0.069 -0.069 
 [-0.64] [-0.37] [-0.56] [-0.29] [-0.61] [-0.61] 
REL 0.100 0.105 0.021 0.061 0.050 0.041 
 [0.98] [1.04] [0.19] [0.59] [0.46] [0.38] 
REL*CSR 0.663*** 0.650*** 0.791*** 0.693*** 0.836*** 0.841*** 
 [3.08] [3.08] [3.51] [3.20] [3.70] [3.71] 
other bidder  0.165 -0.007 0.123 0.016 0.012 
  [0.87] [-0.03] [0.63] [0.08] [0.06] 
cash offer  0.072 -0.010 -0.004 -0.020 -0.019 
  [0.83] [-0.09] [-0.04] [-0.18] [-0.17] 
tender offer  0.182* 0.145 0.151 0.138 0.148 
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  [1.80] [1.25] [1.42] [1.16] [1.26] 
hostile  0.374** 0.450** 0.431** 0.442** 0.424** 
  [2.04] [2.19] [2.31] [2.08] [2.02] 
toehold  0.239 0.074 0.186 0.065 0.043 
  [0.90] [0.26] [0.66] [0.23] [0.15] 
deal value  -0.070** -0.042 -0.074* -0.044 -0.049 
  [-2.36] [-0.90] [-1.78] [-0.94] [-1.04] 
acquirer size   0.022 0.035 0.026 0.032 
   [0.68] [1.14] [0.78] [0.96] 
acquirer FCF   0.665** 0.592* 0.658** 0.661** 
   [2.01] [1.88] [1.98] [1.99] 
target m/b   -0.020** -0.019** -0.024** -0.024** 
   [-2.09] [-2.36] [-2.39] [-2.42] 
target FCF   -0.751** -0.872*** -0.655** -0.688** 
   [-2.35] [-3.32] [-2.02] [-2.13] 
target leverage   0.029  0.227 0.213 
   [0.11]  [0.84] [0.78] 
target institutional   -0.710***  -0.787*** -0.762*** 
   [-2.86]  [-3.13] [-3.01] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 467 467 379 430 379 379 
R-squared 0.023 0.078 0.149 0.129 0.171 0.169 
F-test 3.48** 4.11*** 4.04*** 4.52*** 3.17*** 3.12*** 
F-test (restriction) 9.53*** 10.46*** 13.33*** 11.84*** 14.69*** 14.81*** 
 
In Table 4.2, CSR is not significant in any regressions, but the interaction REL*CSR is significant 
at 1% level in all regressions, providing consistent evidence for hypothesis 1. However, the results 
should not be interpreted as acquirers of non-religious counties do not value target CSR. Since 
different dimension of CSR gets evaluated differently by acquirers, in order to see how CSR affects 
M&A premium, it is more reasonable to test each dimension separately, as Malik (2014) does. Our 
measure of CSR is only to investigate how the impact of CSR varies across acquirers’ religiosity. 
In addition, the F-values of the restriction tests in Table 4.2 are all larger than those reported in 
Table 4.1, implying that for acquirers of religious counties, the impact of CSR on premium is 
primarily driven by the four CSR dimensions including environment, community, diversity, and 
human rights.  
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Despite that the positive association between target CSR and M&A premium is stronger for 
acquirers headquartered in highly religious counties, the reason can be that religious acquirer 
managers pay a higher premium for targets’ CSR strengths or that they pay a lower premium for 
targets’ CSR concerns. To test hypothesis 2a and 2b, we interact REL with targets’ total strengths 
score (TS) and total concerns score (TC) to see how the interactions are associated with M&A 
premium. Table 4.3 presents the results of the test on hypothesis 2a.  
Table 4.3: Test on Hypothesis 2a 
The table presents the result of seven OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A 
premium in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test 
variables are the following: TS, the target’s total strengths score based on the six dimensions including environment, 
community, diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; Religiosity, the religiosity of the county 
where the acquirer is headquartered; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if Religiosity is in the fourth quartile 
of the sample and zero otherwise; REL*TS, the interaction between REL and TS. Controls for deal characteristics are 
the following: other bidder, a dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; 
cash offer, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the deal is unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer 
held more than 5% of the target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of 
the transaction value in millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm 
of the acquirer’s total assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided 
by total assets; target m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the 
announcement; target FCF, the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, 
the target's total long-term debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional 
investors before the deal. We control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-
digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for 
regression 7. F-test is for the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null 
hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TS -0.001 -0.080 0.085 0.000 0.078 0.050 -0.044 
 [-0.01] [-0.56] [0.57] [0.00] [0.50] [0.30] [-0.26] 
Religiosity -0.644*       
 [-1.70]       
REL  -0.027 -0.021 -0.139 -0.077 -0.131 -0.144 
  [-0.26] [-0.21] [-1.21] [-0.72] [-1.14] [-1.24] 
REL*TS  -0.151 -0.118 -0.031 -0.097 0.014 0.034 
  [-0.53] [-0.43] [-0.11] [-0.34] [0.05] [0.12] 
other bidder 0.065  0.202 0.060 0.159 0.074 0.073 
 [0.31]  [1.06] [0.28] [0.80] [0.34] [0.34] 
cash offer -0.027  0.075 -0.030 -0.018 -0.037 -0.037 
 [-0.25]  [0.85] [-0.27] [-0.18] [-0.32] [-0.33] 
tender offer 0.124  0.179* 0.116 0.138 0.108 0.119 
 [1.05]  [1.75] [0.98] [1.27] [0.89] [0.99] 
hostile 0.412**  0.348* 0.425** 0.416** 0.423* 0.403* 
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 [1.98]  [1.88] [2.03] [2.20] [1.95] [1.87] 
toehold 0.083  0.256 0.061 0.187 0.044 0.028 
 [0.29]  [0.95] [0.21] [0.65] [0.15] [0.09] 
deal value -0.052  -0.076** -0.050 -0.089** -0.047 -0.053 
 [-1.01]  [-2.33] [-0.98] [-2.00] [-0.91] [-1.03] 
acquirer size 0.033   0.032 0.042 0.035 0.041 
 [0.98]   [0.98] [1.38] [1.02] [1.21] 
acquirer FCF 0.794**   0.804** 0.724** 0.816** 0.890** 
 [2.37]   [2.38] [2.26] [2.40] [2.38] 
target m/b -0.017*   -0.017* -0.017** -0.020** -0.020** 
 [-1.73]   [-1.70] [-2.06] [-1.97] [-2.00] 
target FCF -0.687**   -0.700** -0.864*** -0.615* -0.638* 
 [-2.11]   [-2.14] [-3.24] [-1.85] [-1.93] 
target leverage -0.022   -0.051  0.125 0.114 
 [-0.09]   [-0.19]  [0.45] [0.41] 
target institutional -0.741***   -0.771***  -0.858*** -0.833*** 
 [-2.90]   [-3.01]  [-3.30] [-3.19] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 379 467 467 379 430 379 379 
R-squared 0.117 0.003 0.056 0.115 0.103 0.134 0.131 
F-test 3.28*** 0.46 2.89*** 3.00*** 3.51*** 2.38*** 2.32*** 
F-test (restriction)  0.83 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 
 
The interaction REL*TS is not significant in any regressions, consistent with our hypothesis that 
acquirers of religious counties do not pay additional premium for target CSR strengths. Also, the 
inclusion of the interaction does not improve the model in any ways, as the R-squared decreases 
from 0.117 in column 1 to 0.115 in column 4, and the F-value decreases from 3.28 in column 1 to 
3.00 in column 4. TS is not significant in any regressions, and we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0 in all restriction tests, making the impact of CSR strengths no different between 
the two types of acquirers. Overall, the result does not show that our finding for hypothesis 1 is 
caused by target CSR strengths. So, we proceed to test hypothesis 2b. Table 4.4 presents the result.  
Table 4.4: Test on Hypothesis 2b 
The table presents the result of seven OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A 
premium in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test 
variables are the following: TC, the target’s total concerns score based on the six dimensions including environment, 
community, diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; Religiosity, the religiosity of the county 
where the acquirer is headquartered; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if Religiosity is in the fourth quartile 
of the sample and zero otherwise; REL*TC, the interaction between REL and TC. Controls for deal characteristics are 
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the following: other bidder, a dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; 
cash offer, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the deal is unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer 
held more than 5% of the target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of 
the transaction value in millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm 
of the acquirer’s total assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided 
by total assets; target m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the 
announcement; target FCF, the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, 
the target's total long-term debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional 
investors before the deal. We control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-
digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for 
regression 7. F-test is for the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null 
hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TC 0.024 0.139 0.191* 0.274** 0.229** 0.263** 0.267** 
 [0.23] [1.33] [1.84] [2.34] [2.06] [2.20] [2.24] 
Religiosity -0.643*       
 [-1.70]       
REL  0.251* 0.266** 0.257* 0.241* 0.276** 0.265* 
  [1.96] [2.12] [1.90] [1.88] [2.03] [1.94] 
REL*TC  -0.644*** -0.664*** -0.854*** -0.725*** -0.866*** -0.860*** 
  [-3.35] [-3.52] [-4.19] [-3.71] [-4.23] [-4.20] 
other bidder 0.070  0.156 0.001 0.128 0.025 0.021 
 [0.33]  [0.83] [0.01] [0.66] [0.11] [0.10] 
cash offer -0.029  0.070 -0.035 -0.016 -0.047 -0.046 
 [-0.26]  [0.81] [-0.32] [-0.16] [-0.42] [-0.42] 
tender offer 0.124  0.180* 0.136 0.145 0.131 0.142 
 [1.05]  [1.79] [1.17] [1.36] [1.11] [1.21] 
hostile 0.408*  0.387** 0.469** 0.439** 0.462** 0.444** 
 [1.95]  [2.11] [2.28] [2.36] [2.17] [2.11] 
toehold 0.085  0.304 0.151 0.257 0.136 0.114 
 [0.29]  [1.14] [0.53] [0.91] [0.48] [0.40] 
deal value -0.055  -0.067** -0.051 -0.080* -0.050 -0.056 
 [-1.11]  [-2.23] [-1.06] [-1.88] [-1.04] [-1.16] 
acquirer size 0.033   0.028 0.037 0.029 0.035 
 [1.01]   [0.85] [1.22] [0.88] [1.08] 
acquirer FCF 0.794**   0.731** 0.663** 0.745** 0.741** 
 [2.37]   [2.23] [2.12] [2.26] [2.25] 
target m/b -0.017*   -0.016* -0.017** -0.020** -0.020** 
 [-1.69]   [-1.69] [-2.13] [-2.01] [-2.01] 
target FCF -0.681**   -0.650** -0.843*** -0.562* -0.591* 
 [-2.08]   [-2.04] [-3.21] [-1.73] [-1.83] 
target leverage -0.026   -0.058  0.118 0.091 
 [-0.10]   [-0.23]  [0.44] [0.34] 
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target institutional -0.735***   -0.732***  -0.809*** -0.780*** 
 [-2.89]   [-2.95]  [-3.21] [-3.08] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 379 467 467 379 430 379 379 
R-squared 0.117 0.026 0.081 0.158 0.132 0.177 0.174 
F-test 3.28*** 3.93*** 4.31*** 4.32*** 4.67*** 3.31*** 3.24*** 
F-test (restriction)  9.46*** 8.41*** 10.99*** 8.78*** 11.81*** 11.37*** 
 
The interaction REL*TC is negatively significant at 1% level throughout all regressions, providing 
strong evidence that acquirers of religious counties pay a lower premium for targets’ CSR 
concerns. For example, the result in column 2 can be interpreted as following:  
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
𝜕𝑇𝐶
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝐿 = 0 − 0.64𝑅𝐸𝐿   (4.2) 
For an acquirer of religious counties, the impact of CSR concerns on premium is captured by 𝛽1 +
𝛽3, and one-unit increase of the target’s CSR concerns score is associated with 0.64-unit decrease 
of premium, while for an acquirer of non-religious counties, the impact of CSR concerns on 
premium is captured by 𝛽1, and there is no association between the target’s CSR concerns score 
and premium. The restriction test confirms that the response of acquirers of religious counties is 
significantly different from 0.    
One thing noticeable is that REL is positively significant in all regressions, meaning that acquirers 
of religious counties pay additional premium regardless of the targets’ CSR concerns. For example, 
the result of column 2 suggests that an acquirer of religious counties would pay 0.25-unit additional 
premium on average. The significance of REL might be caused by the correlations among 
REL*TC, REL, and TC, as it is not observed in previous tables. To rule out the possibility of 
multicollinearity, we check through Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of these variables but find 
they are acceptable: the VIF of REL*TC is around 2.5; the VIF of REL is around 2.1; the VIF of 
TC is around 1.5. 
In Table 4.4, TC is positively significant in column 3-7, indicating that the negative sign of CSR 
reported in Table 4.1 is driven by the positive sign of CSR concerns. For the positively significant 
result of CSR concerns, we argue that it is also caused by the effect of employee relationship and 
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product.11 When we drop the two dimensions and repeat the test on hypothesis 2b, TC does not 
show any significance. Table 4.5 presents the result. 
Table 4.5: Test on Hypothesis 2b by Excluding Employee Relationship and Product from TC 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: TC, the target’s total concerns score based on the four dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the religiosity of the county where the 
acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; REL*TC, the interaction between 
REL and TC. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a dummy variable that equals to one if 
there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is paid 
entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is tender offer and 
zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, 
a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of the target’s ownership before the deal and 
zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in millions. Controls for firm characteristics 
are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the 
acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target m/b, the target’s market to book ratio 
based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, the target's free cash flow calculated 
by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term debt divided by total assets; target 
institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. We control for year fixed effect for 
all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 5 and targets’ 
industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6. F-test is for the joint test on all regressors. F-test 
(restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TC 0.135 0.174 0.197 0.172 0.179 0.187 
 [1.08] [1.41] [1.43] [1.32] [1.28] [1.34] 
REL 0.256** 0.255** 0.220* 0.228* 0.240* 0.232* 
 [2.09] [2.12] [1.69] [1.84] [1.84] [1.78] 
REL*TC -0.927*** -0.909*** -1.114*** -0.987*** -1.127*** -1.132*** 
 [-3.70] [-3.69] [-4.19] [-3.84] [-4.23] [-4.24] 
other bidder  0.153 -0.009 0.120 0.008 0.008 
  [0.82] [-0.04] [0.61] [0.04] [0.04] 
cash offer  0.069 -0.019 -0.006 -0.029 -0.029 
  [0.81] [-0.17] [-0.06] [-0.26] [-0.26] 
tender offer  0.179* 0.142 0.146 0.133 0.144 
  [1.78] [1.23] [1.37] [1.13] [1.23] 
hostile  0.373** 0.441** 0.424** 0.440** 0.420** 
  [2.05] [2.16] [2.28] [2.08] [2.01] 
toehold  0.268 0.113 0.223 0.097 0.077 
  [1.01] [0.40] [0.80] [0.34] [0.27] 
deal value  -0.065** -0.035 -0.068 -0.035 -0.041 
 
11 Another explanation proposed by a reviewer is that targets with more CSR concerns may get undervalued by the 
stock market before the M&A deals. As acquirers pay for the true value of the targets, it creates a false appearance 
that these targets get paid with a higher premium.  
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  [-2.19] [-0.74] [-1.63] [-0.74] [-0.86] 
acquirer size   0.020 0.033 0.023 0.029 
   [0.63] [1.08] [0.70] [0.89] 
acquirer FCF   0.699** 0.620** 0.706** 0.706** 
   [2.13] [1.98] [2.14] [2.14] 
target m/b   -0.019* -0.018** -0.022** -0.022** 
   [-1.91] [-2.23] [-2.22] [-2.23] 
target FCF   -0.738** -0.875*** -0.646** -0.679** 
   [-2.32] [-3.34] [-2.00] [-2.10] 
target leverage   -0.010  0.176 0.153 
   [-0.04]  [0.66] [0.57] 
target institutional   -0.727***  -0.809*** -0.778*** 
   [-2.93]  (-3.22) (-3.07) 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 467 467 379 430 379 379 
R-squared 0.032 0.084 0.159 0.135 0.179 0.176 
F-test 4.84*** 4.47*** 4.35*** 4.78*** 3.34*** 3.29*** 
F-test (restriction) 12.74*** 11.28*** 15.23*** 12.91*** 16.22*** 16.01*** 
 
To ensure that our results are not affected by outliers, we retest the three hypothesises with 
winsorized data. Considering the sample size, we winsorize the continuous variables at 1% level. 
Table 4.6 presents the result for hypothesis 1, and Table 4.7 and 4.8 present the results for 
hypothesis 2a and 2b, respectively. Overall, the results from the winsorized data are similar to 
those of the unwinsorized data, thus provide consistent support for our arguments. 
Table 4.6: Test on Hypothesis 1 with the Data Winsorized at 1% Level 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; 
REL*CSR, the interaction between REL and CSR. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to 
one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of the 
target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in 
millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target 
m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, 
the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term 
debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. 
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We control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) 
dummies for regression 5 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6. F-test is for 
the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 =
0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSR -0.130 -0.111 -0.201** -0.136 -0.210** -0.214** 
 [-1.46] [-1.27] [-2.12] [-1.48] [-2.20] [-2.23] 
REL 0.081 0.091 0.020 0.039 0.041 0.033 
 [0.80] [0.92] [0.19] [0.38] [0.39] [0.31] 
REL*CSR 0.420** 0.433*** 0.626*** 0.480*** 0.653*** 0.656*** 
 [2.49] [2.61] [3.55] [2.83] [3.68] [3.70] 
other bidder  0.155 -0.011 0.129 0.014 0.008 
  [0.84] [-0.05] [0.67] [0.07] [0.04] 
cash offer  0.082 0.011 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 
  [0.97] [0.11] [0.05] [-0.01] [-0.01] 
tender offer  0.180* 0.160 0.157 0.159 0.167 
  [1.82] [1.41] [1.50] [1.37] [1.45] 
hostile  0.365** 0.436** 0.412** 0.427** 0.410** 
  [2.03] [2.17] [2.25] [2.06] [1.99] 
toehold  0.270 0.138 0.238 0.126 0.108 
  [1.03] [0.50] [0.86] [0.45] [0.38] 
deal value  -0.062** -0.026 -0.057 -0.026 -0.031 
  [-2.08] [-0.55] [-1.35] [-0.56] [-0.68] 
acquirer size   0.027 0.036 0.030 0.037 
   [0.85] [1.18] [0.93] [1.13] 
acquirer FCF   0.615 0.641 0.632 0.622 
   [1.24] [1.36] [1.26] [1.24] 
target m/b   -0.032** -0.027** -0.036*** -0.037*** 
   [-2.29] [-2.18] [-2.60] [-2.66] 
target FCF   -0.627** -0.864*** -0.529* -0.554* 
   [-2.02] [-3.02] [-1.67] [-1.76] 
target leverage   0.048  0.229 0.219 
   [0.19]  [0.86] [0.82] 
target institutional   -0.728***  -0.803*** -0.778*** 
   [-3.02]  [-3.28] [-3.16] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 467 467 379 430 379 379 
R-squared 0.014 0.069 0.142 0.112 0.162 0.161 
F-test 2.15* 3.60*** 3.80*** 3.84*** 2.97*** 2.95*** 
F-test (restriction) 3.98** 5.08** 7.96*** 5.68** 8.55*** 8.54*** 
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Table 4.7: Test on Hypothesis 2a with the Data Winsorized at 1% Level 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: TS, the target’s total strengths score based on the six dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; 
REL*TS, the interaction between REL and TS. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to 
one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of the 
target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in 
millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target 
m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, 
the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term 
debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. 
We control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) 
dummies for regression 5 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6. F-test is for 
the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 =
0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TS -0.077 0.086 -0.028 0.060 -0.075 -0.072 
 [-0.54] [0.57] [-0.17] [0.38] [-0.45] [-0.43] 
REL -0.024 -0.019 -0.165 -0.093 -0.160 -0.174 
 [-0.24] [-0.19] [-1.49] [-0.90] [-1.43] [-1.55] 
REL*TS -0.104 -0.073 0.069 -0.025 0.110 0.135 
 [-0.37] [-0.26] [0.24] [-0.09] [0.37] [0.46] 
other bidder  0.193 0.059 0.160 0.077 0.076 
  [1.04] [0.28] [0.82] [0.36] [0.36] 
cash offer  0.080 -0.004 -0.005 -0.014 -0.013 
  [0.94] [-0.04] [-0.05] [-0.12] [-0.12] 
tender offer  0.179* 0.137 0.150 0.135 0.144 
  [1.80] [1.19] [1.41] [1.14] [1.23] 
hostile  0.336* 0.398* 0.395** 0.393* 0.372* 
  [1.86] [1.95] [2.14] [1.86] [1.78] 
toehold  0.253 0.089 0.201 0.071 0.055 
  [0.96] [0.31] [0.72] [0.25] [0.19] 
deal value  -0.072** -0.032 -0.070 -0.028 -0.034 
  [-2.20] [-0.63] [-1.56] [-0.55] [-0.67] 
acquirer size   0.033 0.040 0.036 0.042 
   [1.02] [1.32] [1.08] [1.26] 
acquirer FCF   0.775 0.777 0.814 0.804 
   [1.54] [1.63] [1.58] [1.57] 
target m/b   -0.029** -0.025** -0.034** -0.035** 
   [-2.07] [-2.03] [-2.37] [-2.43] 
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target FCF   -0.638** -0.879*** -0.547* -0.571* 
   [-2.02] [-3.04] [-1.70] [-1.78] 
target leverage   -0.005  0.168 0.161 
   [-0.02]  [0.62] [0.59] 
target institutional   -0.741***  -0.829*** -0.805*** 
   [-2.98]  [-3.27] [-3.16] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 467 467 379 430 379 379 
R-squared 0.002 0.055 0.111 0.094 0.129 0.127 
F-test 0.32 2.84*** 2.86*** 3.18*** 2.27*** 2.24*** 
F-test (restriction) 0.51 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 
 
Table 4.8: Test on Hypothesis 2b with the Data Winsorized at 1% Level 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: TC, the target’s total concerns score based on the six dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; 
REL*TC, the interaction between REL and TC. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to 
one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of the 
target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in 
millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target 
m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, 
the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term 
debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. 
We control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) 
dummies for regression 5 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6. F-test is for 
the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 =
0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TC 0.139 0.189* 0.271** 0.219** 0.263** 0.268** 
 [1.34] [1.84] [2.34] [1.99] [2.24] [2.29] 
REL 0.229* 0.245** 0.221* 0.207 0.237* 0.226* 
 [1.83] [1.99] [1.67] [1.64] [1.78] [1.70] 
REL*TC -0.576*** -0.597*** -0.790*** -0.658*** -0.804*** -0.798*** 
 [-3.04] [-3.21] [-3.94] [-3.40] [-4.00] [-3.96] 
other bidder  0.153 0.012 0.135 0.038 0.034 
  [0.83] [0.06] [0.70] [0.18] [0.17] 
cash offer  0.076 -0.010 -0.002 -0.024 -0.023 
  [0.90] [-0.09] [-0.02] [-0.22] [-0.21] 
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tender offer  0.180* 0.154 0.157 0.156 0.165 
  [1.84] [1.36] [1.50] [1.35] [1.43] 
hostile  0.369** 0.433** 0.414** 0.422** 0.405** 
  [2.06] [2.16] [2.27] [2.03] [1.97] 
toehold  0.297 0.176 0.267 0.160 0.140 
  [1.14] [0.63] [0.97] [0.57] [0.50] 
deal value  -0.063** -0.036 -0.062 -0.034 -0.040 
  [-2.10] [-0.74] [-1.45] [-0.71] [-0.83] 
acquirer size   0.028 0.035 0.030 0.036 
   [0.88] [1.15] [0.92] [1.11] 
acquirer FCF   0.682 0.692 0.725 0.712 
   [1.39] [1.49] [1.45] [1.43] 
target m/b   -0.028** -0.025** -0.033** -0.034** 
   [-2.04] [-2.09] [-2.38] [-2.40] 
target FCF   -0.592* -0.852*** -0.500 -0.527* 
   [-1.91] [-2.99] [-1.58] [-1.67] 
target leverage   -0.021  0.149 0.125 
   [-0.08]  [0.56] [0.47] 
target institutional   -0.703***  -0.779*** -0.750*** 
   [-2.91]  [-3.17] [-3.04] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 467 467 379 430 379 379 
R-squared 0.021 0.076 0.149 0.119 0.168 0.166 
F-test 3.18** 4.01*** 4.03*** 4.15*** 3.09*** 3.05*** 
F-test (restriction) 7.32*** 6.45** 9.13*** 7.03*** 9.81*** 9.41*** 
 
4.2 Robustness Check 
We conduct eight robustness tests: first, we test M&A premium calculated by targets’ stock price 
four weeks prior to the announcement; second, we control for the acquirer’s CSR rating; third, we 
control for whether the acquirer and the target are in the same industry; fourth, we control for the 
acquirer’s state fixed effect; fifth, we drop some states with high religiosity; sixth, we test only 
100-percent deals; seventh, we drop repeated acquirers; last, we construct three sub-samples by 
dropping the first, second, and third quartile of the sample based on religiosity, and test these sub-
samples. All these tests are conducted with unwinsorized data.  
To ensure that our results do not hinge upon the dependent variable that we use, we repeat the tests 
with a premium calculated by targets’ stock price four weeks before the announcement. 
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Accordingly, we recalculate target market-to-book with the four-week lagged stock price. Table 
4.9 presents the result for hypothesis 1.  
Table 4.9: Test on Hypothesis 1 with Four-Week Premium 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price four weeks before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; 
REL*CSR, the interaction between REL and CSR. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to 
one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of the 
target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in 
millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target 
m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price four weeks before the announcement; target 
FCF, the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-
term debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the 
deal. We control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) 
dummies for regression 5 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6. F-test is for 
the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 =
0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSR -0.171* -0.155* -0.170* -0.124 -0.175* -0.177* 
 [-1.90] [-1.75] [-1.72] [-1.33] [-1.75] [-1.79] 
REL 0.185* 0.198* 0.108 0.123 0.132 0.124 
 [1.77] [1.91] [0.97] [1.17] [1.17] [1.10] 
REL*CSR 0.412** 0.412** 0.449** 0.353** 0.459** 0.456** 
 [2.40] [2.43] [2.44] [2.04] [2.48] [2.49] 
other bidder  0.145 -0.008 0.093 0.027 -0.005 
  [0.75] [-0.04] [0.46] [0.12] [-0.02] 
cash offer  0.183** 0.041 0.051 0.044 0.048 
  [2.06] [0.35] [0.51] [0.38] [0.42] 
tender offer  0.136 0.035 0.058 0.016 -0.001 
  [1.31] [0.29] [0.53] [0.13] [-0.00] 
hostile  0.157 0.269 0.261 0.248 0.267 
  [0.83] [1.26] [1.36] [1.11] [1.22] 
toehold  0.307 0.093 0.215 0.100 0.121 
  [1.12] [0.31] [0.74] [0.33] [0.41] 
deal value  -0.063** -0.088* -0.109** -0.089* -0.088* 
  [-2.09] [-1.81] [-2.55] [-1.84] [-1.83] 
acquirer size   0.081** 0.087*** 0.083** 0.088*** 
   [2.40] [2.81] [2.39] [2.59] 
acquirer FCF   0.736** 0.627* 0.758** 0.749** 
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   [2.14] [1.94] [2.18] [2.18] 
target m/b   -0.014 -0.010 -0.016 -0.016 
   [-1.32] [-1.11] [-1.42] [-1.47] 
target FCF   -0.732** -0.719*** -0.676** -0.622* 
   [-2.19] [-2.66] [-1.99] [-1.85] 
target leverage   0.141  0.256 0.375 
   [0.52]  [0.90] [1.33] 
target institutional   -0.642**  -0.695*** -0.757*** 
   [-2.49]  [-2.65] [-2.90] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 467 467 379 430 379 379 
R-squared 0.015 0.059 0.117 0.097 0.131 0.146 
F-test 2.31* 3.07*** 3.05*** 3.30*** 2.31*** 2.63*** 
F-test (restriction) 2.65 3.08* 3.16* 2.41 3.22* 3.16* 
 
Hypothesis 1 is supported by the regressions on the four-week premium. In column 1, we repeat 
the simple regression, and REL*CSR is positively significant at 5% level. As we add more 
controls, the interaction term stays significant at 5% level in column 2-6. The results of the 
restriction tests are less persuasive as we can only reject the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0 at 
10% level for the regressions in column 2, 3, 5, and 6; however, this might be caused by the 
disturbance from CSR strengths since we can still reject the null hypothesis at 5% level in all 
restriction tests for hypothesis 2b. Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 present the results of the tests on 
hypothesis 2a and 2b, respectively. The results are similar to those of the previous tests.  
Table 4.10: Test on Hypothesis 2a with Four-Week Premium 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price four weeks before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: TS, the target’s total strengths score based on the six dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; 
REL*TS, the interaction between REL and TS. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to 
one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of the 
target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in 
millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target 
m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price four weeks before the announcement; target 
FCF, the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-
term debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the 
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deal. We control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) 
dummies for regression 5 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6. F-test is for 
the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 =
0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TS -0.187 -0.046 -0.063 0.000 -0.096 -0.106 
 [-1.29] [-0.30] [-0.37] [0.00] [-0.56] [-0.63] 
REL 0.101 0.111 0.016 0.061 0.031 0.012 
 [0.95] [1.06] [0.13] [0.56] [0.26] [0.10] 
REL*TS -0.221 -0.182 -0.146 -0.201 -0.118 -0.052 
 [-0.77] [-0.64] [-0.49] [-0.70] [-0.39] [-0.17] 
other bidder  0.176 0.038 0.112 0.064 0.034 
  [0.90] [0.17] [0.55] [0.28] [0.15] 
cash offer  0.179** 0.030 0.045 0.037 0.042 
  [2.00] [0.26] [0.44] [0.32] [0.36] 
tender offer  0.132 0.016 0.050 -0.004 -0.018 
  [1.26] [0.13] [0.46] [-0.04] [-0.15] 
hostile  0.128 0.241 0.245 0.226 0.242 
  [0.68] [1.12] [1.28] [1.01] [1.10] 
toehold  0.290 0.059 0.194 0.061 0.083 
  [1.05] [0.20] [0.67] [0.20] [0.28] 
deal value  -0.059* -0.079 -0.109** -0.078 -0.077 
  [-1.79] [-1.52] [-2.41] [-1.47] [-1.47] 
acquiror size   0.082** 0.088*** 0.084** 0.088** 
   [2.40] [2.81] [2.38] [2.57] 
acquiror FCF   0.844** 0.717** 0.871** 0.854** 
   [2.43] [2.20] [2.48] [2.46] 
target m/b   -0.013 -0.009 -0.014 -0.015 
   [-1.19] [-0.98] [-1.28] [-1.35] 
target FCF   -0.761** -0.743*** -0.711** -0.659* 
   [-2.27] [-2.74] [-2.08] [-1.95] 
target leverage   0.095  0.205 0.328 
   [0.35]  [0.72] [1.14] 
target institutional   -0.684***  -0.746*** -0.806*** 
   [-2.60]  [-2.78] [-3.02] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 467 467 379 430 379 379 
R-squared 0.010 0.048 0.103 0.089 0.116 0.131 
F-test 1.49 2.44** 2.64*** 2.99*** 2.02*** 2.32*** 
F-test (restriction) 2.52 0.75 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.33 
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Table 4.11: Test on Hypothesis 2b with Four-Week Premium 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price four weeks before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: TC, the target’s total concerns score based on the six dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; 
REL*TC, the interaction between REL and TC. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to 
one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of the 
target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in 
millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target 
m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price four weeks before the announcement; target 
FCF, the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-
term debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the 
deal. We control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) 
dummies for regression 5 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6. F-test is for 
the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 =
0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TC 0.141 0.201* 0.224* 0.184 0.216* 0.210* 
 [1.33] [1.89] [1.83] [1.62] [1.73] [1.70] 
REL 0.357*** 0.370*** 0.304** 0.291** 0.322** 0.298** 
 [2.75] [2.89] [2.16] [2.21] [2.26] [2.11] 
REL*TC -0.618*** -0.619*** -0.675*** -0.575*** -0.671*** -0.634*** 
 [-3.16] [-3.21] [-3.18] [-2.87] [-3.14] [-2.99] 
other bidder  0.141 0.001 0.094 0.037 0.008 
  [0.73] [0.00] [0.47] [0.16] [0.04] 
cash offer  0.176** 0.028 0.048 0.031 0.036 
  [2.00] [0.25] [0.47] [0.27] [0.31] 
tender offer  0.136 0.034 0.059 0.017 0.000 
  [1.32] [0.28] [0.54] [0.14] [0.00] 
hostile  0.168 0.275 0.267 0.251 0.269 
  [0.90] [1.29] [1.40] [1.13] [1.24] 
toehold  0.337 0.132 0.246 0.136 0.152 
  [1.23] [0.44] [0.86] [0.45] [0.51] 
deal value  -0.066** -0.093* -0.111** -0.093* -0.093* 
  [-2.15] [-1.85] [-2.55] [-1.85] [-1.85] 
acquiror size   0.080** 0.085*** 0.082** 0.086** 
   [2.36] [2.74] [2.34] [2.53] 
acquiror FCF   0.762** 0.649** 0.791** 0.784** 
   [2.24] [2.02] [2.30] [2.30] 
target m/b   -0.013 -0.009 -0.014 -0.015 
   [-1.20] [-1.06] [-1.31] [-1.34] 
target FCF   -0.717** -0.719*** -0.665* -0.617* 
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   [-2.16] [-2.67] [-1.96] [-1.84] 
target leverage   0.099  0.206 0.314 
   [0.37]  [0.73] [1.12] 
target institutional   -0.626**  -0.679*** -0.739*** 
   [-2.42]  [-2.58] [-2.82] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 467 467 379 430 379 379 
R-squared 0.023 0.068 0.127 0.106 0.139 0.152 
F-test 3.56** 3.55*** 3.34*** 3.64*** 2.48*** 2.75*** 
F-test (restriction) 8.14*** 6.28** 6.15** 5.19** 6.16** 5.42** 
 
Malik (2014) shows that the positive association between target CSR and premium is affected by 
the acquirer’s CSR. Specifically, high CSR acquirers value target CSR more and are more likely 
to pay a higher premium to high CSR targets. Since McGuire et al. (2012) show that firms 
headquartered in highly religious counties tend to have lower CSR ratings, the acquirers of 
religious counties should not be those high CSR acquirers, and our finding should not be caused 
by the acquirer’s CSR. To confirm this conjecture, we control for the acquirer’s net CSR score 
(ACSR) as well as its interactions with the target’s net CSR score, and test the following model 
for hypothesis 1:  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅 +  𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝐿 +  𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝐿 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝑅 +  𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑅 +  𝛽5𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑅 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝑅
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠   (4.3) 
We calculate ACSR with all six dimensions. Because some acquirers’ data is not available on 
MSCI, after adding ACSR, we lose 70 observations. With all missing control variable dropped, 
the sample size reduces to 325, including 81 observations (24.92%) defined as REL = 1. Table 
4.12 reports the result. 
Table 4.12: Test on Hypothesis 1 with the Control for Acquirer CSR 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; 
REL*CSR, the interaction between REL and CSR; ACSR, the acquirer’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions 
including environment, community, diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; ACSR*CSR, the 
interaction between ACSR and CSR. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a dummy 
variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to one 
43 
 
if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is unsolicited 
and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of the target’s 
ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in millions. 
Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets in 
millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target m/b, the 
target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, the 
target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term debt 
divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. We 
control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies 
for regression 5 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6. F-test is for the joint test 
on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSR -0.171* -0.115 -0.127 -0.110 -0.112 -0.125 
 [-1.70] [-1.16] [-1.15] [-1.05] [-1.01] [-1.11] 
REL 0.096 0.095 0.048 0.061 0.046 0.042 
 [0.83] [0.84] [0.40] [0.53] [0.37] [0.35] 
REL*CSR 0.509*** 0.477** 0.561*** 0.521*** 0.553*** 0.558*** 
 [2.62] [2.50] [2.74] [2.64] [2.68] [2.69] 
ACSR 0.085 0.094 0.010 0.024 -0.024 -0.010 
 [1.44] [1.59] [0.15] [0.38] [-0.34] [-0.14] 
ACSR*CSR 0.111 0.222** 0.160 0.143 0.114 0.142 
 [1.11] [2.21] [1.42] [1.33] [0.99] [1.25] 
other bidder  0.002 -0.110 -0.057 -0.104 -0.087 
  [0.01] [-0.47] [-0.26] [-0.43] [-0.37] 
cash offer  0.069 0.064 -0.003 0.042 0.053 
  [0.72] [0.53] [-0.03] [0.34] [0.43] 
tender offer  0.215** 0.196 0.206* 0.184 0.188 
  [1.98] [1.55] [1.79] [1.41] [1.46] 
hostile  0.448** 0.591** 0.521** 0.599** 0.582** 
  [2.20] [2.59] [2.47] [2.53] [2.48] 
toehold  0.223 0.050 0.188 0.022 0.026 
  [0.78] [0.16] [0.62] [0.07] [0.08] 
deal value  -0.103*** -0.032 -0.087* -0.036 -0.042 
  [-2.96] [-0.61] [-1.88] [-0.68] [-0.78] 
acquirer size   0.018 0.035 0.027 0.028 
   [0.49] [1.05] [0.71] [0.75] 
acquirer FCF   0.645 0.660 0.728 0.746 
   [1.28] [1.39] [1.38] [1.43] 
target m/b   -0.019 -0.019* -0.022 -0.023 
   [-1.36] [-1.92] [-1.56] [-1.63] 
target FCF   -0.736** -0.837*** -0.626* -0.651* 
   [-2.09] [-2.97] [-1.75] [-1.83] 
target leverage   -0.011  0.160 0.144 
   [-0.04]  [0.54] [0.48] 
44 
 
target institutional   -0.932***  -1.008*** -0.997*** 
   [-3.33]  [-3.55] [-3.49] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 397 397 325 367 325 325 
R-squared 0.024 0.093 0.167 0.135 0.182 0.183 
F-test 1.82 3.40*** 3.40*** 3.46*** 2.60*** 2.63*** 
F-test (restriction) 3.95** 4.72** 6.19** 5.91** 6.29** 6.09** 
 
In all regressions, REL*CSR is significant at 5% or 1% level, indicating that our previous results 
are not affected by acquirers’ CSR ratings. Also, ACSR is not significant in any regressions but 
ACSR*CSR is positively significant in column 2, consistent with the finding of Malik (2014) that 
high CSR acquirers pay more for target CSR. We also test hypothesis 2a and 2b by controlling for 
ACSR and its interactions with TS and TC and obtain unchanged results.  
Considering the finding that targets receive a higher premium when selling to acquirers from the 
same industry (Balajrishnan & Koza, 1993; Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991), in the third test, we 
control for acquirers and targets’ industry relatedness. We construct a dummy variable 
“horizontal,” which equals to one if the acquirer and the target belong to the same industry (at two-
digit SIC-code level). The summary statistics shows that 66% of the sample deals are made within 
the same industry. Table 4.13 presents the result for hypothesis 1.  
Table 4.13: Test on Hypothesis 1 with the Control for Horizontal 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; 
REL*CSR, the interaction between REL and CSR; horizontal, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer and 
the target belong to the same industry (at two-digit SIC code level) and zero otherwise. Controls for deal characteristics 
are the following: other bidder, a dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero 
otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender 
offer, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the deal is unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
acquirer held more than 5% of the target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural 
logarithm of the transaction value in millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the 
natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by 
EBITDA divided by total assets; target m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one 
week before the announcement; target FCF, the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; 
target leverage, the target's total long-term debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held 
by institutional investors before the deal. We control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ 
industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 5 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) 
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dummies for regression 6. F-test is for the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test 
on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSR -0.128 -0.108 -0.187* -0.132 -0.195** -0.198** 
 [-1.45] [-1.24] [-1.96] [-1.45] [-2.03] [-2.06] 
REL 0.079 0.088 0.021 0.043 0.047 0.037 
 [0.76] [0.87] [0.19] [0.42] [0.43] [0.34] 
REL*CSR 0.450*** 0.461*** 0.620*** 0.495*** 0.652*** 0.653*** 
 [2.66] [2.77] [3.50] [2.92] [3.67] [3.68] 
horizontal 0.032 0.029 0.026 0.007 0.066 0.043 
 [0.39] [0.35] [0.28] [0.09] [0.71] [0.45] 
other bidder  0.161 -0.018 0.125 0.000 -0.002 
  [0.85] [-0.08] [0.63] [0.00] [-0.01] 
cash offer  0.081 -0.016 -0.009 -0.026 -0.026 
  [0.92] [-0.14] [-0.09] [-0.23] [-0.23] 
tender offer  0.179* 0.139 0.146 0.131 0.143 
  [1.77] [1.19] [1.36] [1.10] [1.21] 
hostile  0.378** 0.470** 0.437** 0.465** 0.445** 
  [2.05] [2.27] [2.33] [2.18] [2.10] 
toehold  0.264 0.096 0.218 0.070 0.060 
  [0.98] [0.33] [0.76] [0.24] [0.21] 
deal value  -0.067** -0.046 -0.077* -0.050 -0.054 
  [-2.26] [-0.99] [-1.83] [-1.07] [-1.15] 
acquirer size   0.030 0.039 0.035 0.040 
   [0.91] [1.27] [1.05] [1.21] 
acquirer FCF   0.680** 0.619* 0.678** 0.675** 
   [2.05] [1.95] [2.03] [2.02] 
target m/b   -0.019* -0.018** -0.022** -0.022** 
   [-1.90] [-2.23] [-2.23] [-2.24] 
target FCF   -0.666** -0.840*** -0.557* -0.586* 
   [-2.07] [-3.16] [-1.70] [-1.79] 
target leverage   -0.006  0.173 0.169 
   [-0.02]  [0.64] [0.62] 
target institutional   -0.745***  -0.816*** -0.798*** 
   [-2.99]  [-3.24] [-3.15] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 467 467 379 430 379 379 
R-squared 0.017 0.072 0.146 0.121 0.168 0.165 
F-test 1.89 3.39*** 3.68*** 3.91*** 2.96*** 2.90*** 
F-test (restriction) 4.86** 6.07** 8.20*** 6.30** 9.06*** 8.98*** 
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The result shows that our finding does not vary with the control for industry relatedness. Despite 
not significant, horizontal presents a positive sign, being aligned with the literature. We conduct 
the same test for hypothesis 2a and 2b, and the results are unchanged.     
In the fourth test, we control for the state where the acquirer firm is headquartered. It is possible 
that in our sample the acquirers of religious counties are clustered in a few highly religious states, 
and therefore, the previous results might be caused by state-level characteristics such as culture 
and legal systems. Controlling for state fixed effect allows us to examine whether there is within-
variation in the same state. Also, we control for year fixed effect and industry fixed effect for all 
regressions. Table 4.14 presents the result for hypothesis 1. 
Table 4.14: Test on Hypothesis 1 with the Control for Acquirers’ State Fixed Effect 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; 
REL*CSR, the interaction between REL and CSR. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to 
one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of the 
target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in 
millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target 
m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, 
the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term 
debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. 
We control for acquires’ state fixed effect and year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at 
one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 1 – 4 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies 
for regression 5 – 8. F-test is for the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on 
the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CSR -0.166* -0.129 -0.216** -0.168* -0.177* -0.140 -0.212** -0.173* 
 [-1.77] [-1.39] [-2.11] [-1.71] [-1.90] [-1.52] [-2.07] [-1.77] 
REL 0.042 0.059 0.043 0.047 0.050 0.070 0.026 0.061 
 [0.32] [0.45] [0.29] [0.35] [0.37] [0.53] [0.18] [0.46] 
REL*CSR 0.490*** 0.475*** 0.666*** 0.547*** 0.508*** 0.497*** 0.658*** 0.565*** 
 [2.75] [2.69] [3.48] [3.00] [2.85] [2.81] [3.46] [3.10] 
other bidder  0.186 -0.107 0.097  0.206 -0.093 0.125 
  [0.89] [-0.44] [0.44]  [0.99] [-0.38] [0.57] 
cash offer  0.044 -0.006 -0.037  0.064 -0.011 -0.029 
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  [0.47] [-0.05] [-0.35]  [0.69] [-0.09] [-0.27] 
tender offer  0.189* 0.115 0.160  0.207* 0.128 0.174 
  [1.74] [0.91] [1.38]  [1.92] [1.01] [1.52] 
hostile  0.264 0.432* 0.352*  0.219 0.395* 0.309 
  [1.32] [1.87] [1.72]  [1.10] [1.70] [1.51] 
toehold  0.274 0.080 0.214  0.269 0.078 0.183 
  [0.97] [0.27] [0.73]  [0.95] [0.26] [0.62] 
deal value  -0.064** -0.040 -0.070  -0.063** -0.049 -0.076* 
  [-2.03] [-0.80] [-1.60]  [-1.99] [-0.99] [-1.74] 
acquirer size   0.024 0.031   0.033 0.043 
   [0.67] [0.92]   [0.93] [1.30] 
acquirer FCF   0.817** 0.721**   0.820** 0.740** 
   [2.28] [2.13]   [2.29] [2.19] 
target m/b   -0.022** -0.018**   -0.022** -0.018** 
   [-2.17] [-2.04]   [-2.14] [-2.07] 
target FCF   -0.675* -0.837***   -0.684* -0.866*** 
   [-1.90] [-2.92]   [-1.92] [-3.03] 
target leverage   0.268    0.279  
   [0.88]    [0.90]  
target institutional   -0.822***    -0.792***  
   [-3.10]    [-2.95]  
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes (A) Yes (A) Yes (A) Yes (A) Yes (T) Yes (T) Yes (T) Yes (T) 
Observations 467 467 379 430 467 467 379 430 
R-squared 0.114 0.152 0.238 0.204 0.109 0.149 0.237 0.204 
F-test 1.10 1.34* 1.63*** 1.60*** 1.05 1.30* 1.59*** 1.59*** 
F-test (restriction) 4.48** 5.19** 7.61*** 6.00** 4.61** 5.49** 7.53*** 6.39** 
 
In Table 4.14, REL*CSR is significant at 1% level in all regressions, showing that our finding is 
not a spurious outcome caused by state characteristics. The result suggests that, even in the same 
state, the acquirers of religious counties evaluate targets’ CSR differently from the acquirers of 
non-religious counties. The tests on hypothesis 2a and 2b also show that our finding is not caused 
by state characteristics.   
In the fifth test, we drop the states that have relatively high religiosity. By doing this, we want to 
rule out the possibility that the acquirers of religious counties are concentrated in a few highly 
religious states and the results are caused by the state-level religiosity. A survey conducted by 
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Gallup International in 2014 provides a rank by religiosity for the U.S. states.12 We pick the top 
ten most religious states and drop them from our sample. As South Dakota and West Virginia are 
not presented in the sample, we drop the other eight states including Alabama (2 obs.), Louisiana 
(2 obs.), Mississippi (1 obs.), Tennessee (11 obs.), Arkansas (6 obs.), Georgia (9 obs.), Oklahoma 
(5 obs.), and Texas (55 obs.). The sample is left with 376 observations, with 76 (20.21%) defined 
as REL = 1. With all missing control variables dropped, the sample is left with 297 observations, 
with 64 (21.55%) defined as REL = 1. Table 4.15 presents the result for hypothesis 1.  
Table 4.15: Test on Hypothesis 1 by Excluding States with High Religiosity 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; 
REL*CSR, the interaction between REL and CSR. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to 
one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of the 
target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in 
millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target 
m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, 
the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term 
debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. 
We control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) 
dummies for regression 5 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6. F-test is for 
the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 =
0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSR -0.106 -0.051 -0.158 -0.088 -0.150 -0.155 
 [-1.08] [-0.53] [-1.44] [-0.85] [-1.37] [-1.41] 
REL 0.104 0.108 0.085 0.073 0.090 0.086 
 [0.87] [0.93] [0.67] [0.61] [0.71] [0.69] 
REL*CSR 0.458** 0.429** 0.604*** 0.445** 0.613*** 0.614*** 
 [2.30] [2.20] [2.83] [2.20] [2.87] [2.88] 
other bidder  0.203 0.009 0.154 0.036 0.025 
  [1.00] [0.04] [0.71] [0.15] [0.11] 
cash offer  0.111 0.036 0.017 0.028 0.035 
  [1.16] [0.29] [0.15] [0.23] [0.28] 
tender offer  0.287*** 0.277** 0.247** 0.279** 0.288** 
  [2.67] [2.16] [2.12] [2.15] [2.24] 
 
12 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_and_territories_by_religiosity 
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hostile  0.279 0.265 0.328 0.231 0.222 
  [1.38] [1.16] [1.58] [0.96] [0.95] 
toehold  0.386 0.250 0.348 0.323 0.320 
  [1.37] [0.82] [1.16] [1.05] [1.04] 
deal value  -0.075** -0.054 -0.089* -0.064 -0.070 
  [-2.24] [-1.03] [-1.93] [-1.21] [-1.32] 
acquirer size   0.029 0.043 0.034 0.037 
   [0.81] [1.28] [0.94] [1.06] 
acquirer FCF   0.641* 0.502 0.539 0.574 
   [1.83] [1.51] [1.51] [1.63] 
target m/b   -0.018* -0.018** -0.020** -0.020** 
   [-1.80] [-2.15] [-2.00] [-2.01] 
target FCF   -0.473 -0.704** -0.365 -0.381 
   [-1.37] [-2.52] [-1.06] [-1.11] 
target leverage   0.140  0.356 0.402 
   [0.47]  [1.14] [1.29] 
target institutional   -0.823***  -0.851*** -0.855*** 
   [-2.93]  [-3.01] [-3.01] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 376 376 297 344 297 297 
R-squared 0.015 0.087 0.163 0.131 0.195 0.200 
F-test 1.76 3.70*** 3.43*** 3.62*** 2.83*** 2.91*** 
F-test (restriction) 4.05** 4.91** 5.99** 4.25** 6.45** 6.40** 
 
The interaction REL*CSR is significant at 5% level in column 1, 2, and 4 and 1% level in column 
3, 5, and 6. Consistent with our previous result, it indicates that our finding is not merely extant 
for a few highly religious states but rather universal. The results of the tests on hypothesis 2a and 
2b also stay the same. 
Because not all of our sample are 100-percent deals (i.e., the acquirer purchases 100-percent of the 
target’s share at a time), in the sixth test, we construct a more homogeneous sample by dropping 
those deals of which the transacted ownership is less than 100-percent. With this restriction, we 
drop 20 observations. Table 4.16 presents the result for hypothesis 1. 
Table 4.16: Test on Hypothesis 1 with 100-Percent Deals Only 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
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religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; 
REL*CSR, the interaction between REL and CSR. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to 
one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
unsolicited and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in millions. Controls for firm 
characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets in millions; acquirer 
FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target m/b, the target’s market to 
book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, the target's free cash flow 
calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term debt divided by total assets; 
target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. We control for year fixed 
effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 5 and 
targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6. F-test is for the joint test on all regressors. F-
test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CSR -0.125 -0.109 -0.177* -0.123 -0.183* -0.186* 
 [-1.40] [-1.25] [-1.85] [-1.34] [-1.90] [-1.93] 
REL 0.105 0.111 0.043 0.060 0.070 0.062 
 [1.00] [1.08] [0.40] [0.58] [0.63] [0.56] 
REL*CSR 0.423** 0.423** 0.575*** 0.451*** 0.598*** 0.602*** 
 [2.47] [2.52] [3.21] [2.63] [3.32] [3.35] 
other bidder  0.130 -0.074 0.091 -0.058 -0.056 
  [0.66] [-0.34] [0.44] [-0.26] [-0.25] 
cash offer  0.071 -0.014 -0.013 -0.026 -0.025 
  [0.81] [-0.12] [-0.13] [-0.23] [-0.22] 
tender offer  0.214** 0.147 0.150 0.128 0.146 
  [2.02] [1.20] [1.35] [1.03] [1.18] 
hostile  0.413** 0.512** 0.471** 0.504** 0.481** 
  [2.10] [2.30] [2.36] [2.18] [2.10] 
deal value  -0.073** -0.061 -0.092** -0.061 -0.067 
  [-2.39] [-1.27] [-2.17] [-1.27] [-1.40] 
acquirer size   0.038 0.050 0.041 0.047 
   [1.14] [1.59] [1.18] [1.40] 
acquirer FCF   0.662* 0.589* 0.680** 0.672** 
   [1.96] [1.83] [2.00] [1.98] 
target m/b   -0.018* -0.017** -0.021** -0.022** 
   [-1.87] [-2.15] [-2.15] [-2.18] 
target FCF   -0.688** -0.831*** -0.600* -0.622* 
   [-2.09] [-3.08] [-1.79] [-1.86] 
target leverage   0.048  0.203 0.205 
   [0.18]  [0.74] [0.74] 
target institutional   -0.766***  -0.851*** -0.828*** 
   [-2.99]  [-3.27] [-3.16] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
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Observations 447 447 362 413 362 362 
R-squared 0.014 0.067 0.138 0.115 0.158 0.157 
F-test 2.05 3.76*** 3.77*** 4.12*** 2.87*** 2.86*** 
F-test (restriction) 4.05** 4.68** 6.74*** 5.03** 7.24*** 7.30*** 
 
Since in this sample all acquirers do not hold any targets’ ownership before the deals, we exclude 
toehold from the controls. In column 1-2, REL*CSR is significant at 5% level, and in column 3-
6, it is significant at 1% level. As such, the result shows that our finding is not affected by the 
percentage of shares acquired. The results of the tests on hypothesis 2a and 2b give the same 
evidence.    
In the seventh test, we drop those deals with repeated acquirers. As mentioned in the data section, 
our sample consists 467 deals made by 348 acquirers, which means that some deals are made by 
the same acquirer. Thus, it is likely that our finding is caused by the firm-level fixed effect of a 
few acquirers. To address this concern, we use only the first deal made by each acquirer to 
construct a sub-sample that has no repeated acquirers. The sub-sample consists 84 acquirers of 
religious counties (24.14%). With all missing control variables dropped, it includes 74 acquirers 
of religious counties (25.34%). Table 4.17 presents the result for hypothesis 1.  
Table 4.17: Test on Hypothesis 1 by Excluding Repeated Acquirers 
The table presents the result of six OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A premium 
in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test variables are 
the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions including environment, community, 
diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one if the 
religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero otherwise; 
REL*CSR, the interaction between REL and CSR. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other bidder, a 
dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that equals to 
one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal is 
unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of the 
target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in 
millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target 
m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, 
the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term 
debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. 
We control for year fixed effect for all regressions and include acquirers’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) 
dummies for regression 5 and targets’ industry (at one-digit SIC-code level) dummies for regression 6. F-test is for 
the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 =
0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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CSR -0.160 -0.158 -0.299*** -0.210** -0.289** -0.311*** 
 [-1.53] [-1.55] [-2.65] [-1.97] [-2.55] [-2.75] 
REL 0.109 0.116 0.047 0.062 0.062 0.046 
 [0.94] [1.01] [0.39] [0.54] [0.51] [0.38] 
REL*CSR 0.504*** 0.515*** 0.738*** 0.582*** 0.761*** 0.780*** 
 [2.73] [2.85] [3.81] [3.18] [3.90] [3.99] 
other bidder  0.375* 0.105 0.349 0.098 0.096 
  [1.72] [0.41] [1.51] [0.38] [0.38] 
cash offer  0.051 -0.064 -0.033 -0.088 -0.085 
  [0.50] [-0.51] [-0.30] [-0.69] [-0.67] 
tender offer  0.105 0.065 0.064 0.063 0.074 
  [0.86] [0.46] [0.51] [0.44] [0.51] 
hostile  0.309 0.511** 0.374* 0.529** 0.515** 
  [1.49] [2.19] [1.78] [2.17] [2.15] 
toehold  0.491 0.106 0.221 0.063 0.040 
  [1.32] [0.28] [0.60] [0.17] [0.11] 
deal value  -0.070** -0.094 -0.111** -0.092 -0.104* 
  [-2.05] [-1.64] [-2.18] [-1.60] [-1.81] 
acquirer size   0.068 0.076* 0.073* 0.082* 
   [1.60] [1.96] [1.68] [1.92] 
acquirer FCF   0.627* 0.644* 0.615* 0.587 
   [1.75] [1.96] [1.70] [1.64] 
target m/b   -0.008 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 
   [-0.77] [-1.45] [-1.21] [-1.16] 
target FCF   -0.826* -1.068*** -0.707 -0.731 
   [-1.82] [-3.28] [-1.52] [-1.58] 
target leverage   0.033  0.157 0.174 
   [0.10]  [0.50] [0.54] 
target institutional   -0.558*  -0.623** -0.576** 
   [-1.95]  [-2.15] [-1.97] 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No Yes (A) Yes (T) 
Observations 348 348 281 323 281 281 
R-squared 0.023 0.078 0.163 0.142 0.191 0.193 
F-test 2.52* 3.01*** 3.20*** 3.69*** 2.57*** 2.61*** 
F-test (restriction) 4.99** 5.58** 7.59*** 6.09** 8.61*** 8.53*** 
 
The result provides strong evidence that our previous finding is not caused by firm-level fixed 
effect, as REL*CSR is significant at 1% level in all regressions. The results for hypothesis 2a and 
2b also remain unchanged.  
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In the last test, we drop the first, second, and third quartile of the sample based on religiosity to 
check if our result still holds for the three sub-samples. Since we define REL = 1 for the fourth 
quartile, we expect our result to hold for all sub-samples. 
For the first sub-sample, we exclude deals if the religiosity is below or equal to 0.4671541, thus 
the non-religious group includes 237 observations, and its sample average religiosity increases to 
0.58. Table 4.18 presents the result for hypothesis 1. Due to the reduced sample size, we control 
for year fixed effect but not industry fixed effect. The result is consistent with previous tests, as 
REL*CSR is positively significant at 1% level in all regressions. In the tests on hypothesis 2a and 
2b, we obtain similar results.  
Table 4.18: Test on Hypothesis 1 by Excluding the First Quartile of Religiosity 
The table presents the result of four OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A 
premium in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test 
variables are the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions including environment, 
community, diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one 
if the religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero 
otherwise; REL*CSR, the interaction between REL and CSR. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other 
bidder, a dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy 
variable that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal 
is unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of 
the target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in 
millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target 
m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, 
the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term 
debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. 
We control for year fixed effect for all regressions. F-test is for the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is 
for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSR -0.167 -0.149 -0.191 -0.159 
 [-1.51] [-1.36] [-1.60] [-1.39] 
REL 0.113 0.116 0.030 0.079 
 [1.00] [1.03] [0.25] [0.68] 
REL*CSR 0.500*** 0.500*** 0.624*** 0.531*** 
 [2.69] [2.71] [3.09] [2.80] 
other bidder  0.280 0.000 0.262 
  [1.17] [0.00] [1.05] 
cash offer  0.035 -0.060 -0.027 
  [0.32] [-0.42] [-0.22] 
tender offer  0.092 0.089 0.118 
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  [0.74] [0.60] [0.89] 
hostile  0.242 0.459* 0.299 
  [1.04] [1.77] [1.26] 
toehold  0.243 0.112 0.292 
  [0.79] [0.33] [0.89] 
deal value  -0.090** -0.031 -0.068 
  [-2.40] [-0.51] [-1.28] 
acquirer size   0.005 0.000 
   [0.12] [0.01] 
acquirer FCF   0.828** 0.779** 
   [2.14] [2.14] 
target m/b   -0.026* -0.021** 
   [-1.72] [-1.97] 
target FCF   -0.602 -0.707** 
   [-1.51] [-2.28] 
target leverage   -0.125  
   [-0.39]  
target institutional   -0.698**  
   [-2.10]  
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 349 349 288 324 
R-squared 0.022 0.064 0.123 0.107 
F-test 2.43* 2.43** 2.37*** 2.68*** 
F-test (restriction) 4.76** 5.35** 6.87*** 5.84** 
 
The second sub-sample excludes observations with religiosity that falls between 0.4671541 and 
0.5826157, and thus, it consists 239 acquirers of non-religious counties, of which the sample 
average religiosity is 0.53. We repeat the tests and obtain unchanged results. Table 4.19 presents 
the result for hypothesis 1. 
Table 4.19: Test on Hypothesis 1 by Excluding the Second Quartile of Religiosity 
The table presents the result of four OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A 
premium in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test 
variables are the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions including environment, 
community, diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one 
if the religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero 
otherwise; REL*CSR, the interaction between REL and CSR. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other 
bidder, a dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy 
variable that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal 
is unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of 
the target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in 
millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
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assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target 
m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, 
the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term 
debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. 
We control for year fixed effect for all regressions. F-test is for the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is 
for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSR -0.202* -0.177 -0.285** -0.210* 
 [-1.77] [-1.58] [-2.31] [-1.75] 
REL 0.105 0.118 0.074 0.067 
 [0.91] [1.04] [0.61] [0.57] 
REL*CSR 0.488** 0.487*** 0.658*** 0.511*** 
 [2.58] [2.62] [3.28] [2.66] 
other bidder  0.288 0.100 0.234 
  [1.19] [0.38] [0.95] 
cash offer  0.086 0.001 0.011 
  [0.83] [0.01] [0.09] 
tender offer  0.243* 0.147 0.134 
  [1.96] [1.03] [1.00] 
hostile  0.326 0.368 0.397* 
  [1.43] [1.43] [1.72] 
toehold  0.133 -0.028 0.084 
  [0.41] [-0.08] [0.24] 
deal value  -0.091** -0.046 -0.105** 
  [-2.52] [-0.83] [-2.09] 
acquirer size   0.022 0.044 
   [0.57] [1.24] 
acquirer FCF   0.965** 0.842** 
   [2.50] [2.31] 
target m/b   -0.013 -0.010 
   [-1.20] [-0.94] 
target FCF   -0.954** -1.166*** 
   [-2.25] [-3.59] 
target leverage   -0.061  
   [-0.19]  
target institutional   -1.009***  
   [-3.40]  
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 351 351 283 320 
R-squared 0.021 0.087 0.194 0.147 
F-test 2.30* 3.44*** 3.99*** 3.82*** 
F-test (restriction) 3.45* 4.25** 5.59** 3.94** 
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We form the third sub-sample by excluding the observations with religiosity from 0.5826157 to 
0.671272, so the non-religious group includes 234 observations with an average religiosity of 0.48. 
Dropping the third quartile increases the difference of average religiosity between the religious 
and the non-religious groups, and also makes our assumption more reasonable: it does not make 
sense to assume a county with a religiosity of 0.68 to be “religious” while another county with a 
religiosity of 0.66 to be “non-religious.” Table 4.20 presents the result for hypothesis 1.  
Table 4.20: Test on Hypothesis 1 by Excluding the Third Quartile of Religiosity 
The table presents the result of four OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of M&A 
premium in percentage, which is calculated by the target’s stock price one week before the announcement. Test 
variables are the following: CSR, the target’s net CSR score based on the six dimensions including environment, 
community, diversity, product, employee relationship, and human rights; REL, a dummy variable that equals to one 
if the religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered is in the fourth quartile of the sample and zero 
otherwise; REL*CSR, the interaction between REL and CSR. Controls for deal characteristics are the following: other 
bidder, a dummy variable that equals to one if there was more than one bidder and zero otherwise; cash offer, a dummy 
variable that equals to one if the deal is paid entirely in cash and zero otherwise; tender offer, a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the deal is tender offer and zero otherwise; hostile bid, a dummy variable that equals to one if the deal 
is unsolicited and zero otherwise; toehold, a dummy variable that equals to one if the acquirer held more than 5% of 
the target’s ownership before the deal and zero otherwise; deal value, the natural logarithm of the transaction value in 
millions. Controls for firm characteristics are the following: acquirer size, the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
assets in millions; acquirer FCF, the acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target 
m/b, the target’s market to book ratio based on the target’s stock price one week before the announcement; target FCF, 
the target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA divided by total assets; target leverage, the target's total long-term 
debt divided by total assets; target institutional, the target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal. 
We control for year fixed effect for all regressions. F-test is for the joint test on all regressors. F-test (restriction) is 
for the linear restriction test on the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSR -0.032 -0.002 -0.052 -0.033 
 [-0.30] [-0.02] [-0.43] [-0.30] 
REL 0.011 0.016 -0.055 -0.026 
 [0.10] [0.15] [-0.50] [-0.25] 
REL*CSR 0.361** 0.390** 0.528*** 0.410** 
 [2.05] [2.27] [2.86] [2.32] 
other bidder  -0.051 -0.243 -0.124 
  [-0.25] [-1.04] [-0.57] 
cash offer  0.006 -0.089 -0.097 
  [0.06] [-0.73] [-0.87] 
tender offer  0.149 0.111 0.119 
  [1.33] [0.86] [1.00] 
hostile  0.629*** 0.743*** 0.693*** 
  [3.22] [3.34] [3.47] 
toehold  0.509 0.280 0.380 
  [1.41] [0.76] [1.04] 
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deal value  -0.056* -0.076 -0.094** 
  [-1.68] [-1.49] [-2.03] 
acquirer size   0.041 0.053 
   [1.12] [1.53] 
acquirer FCF   0.770** 0.663** 
   [2.22] [2.00] 
target m/b   -0.015 -0.016* 
   [-1.37] [-1.91] 
target FCF   -0.609* -0.686** 
   [-1.73] [-2.04] 
target leverage   0.229  
   [0.77]  
target institutional   -0.677**  
   [-2.53]  
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 346 346 283 322 
R-squared 0.020 0.091 0.179 0.144 
F-test 2.18* 3.54*** 3.63*** 3.75*** 
F-test (restriction) 5.40** 7.90*** 10.31*** 7.20** 
 
The result is consistent with those of previous tests. REL*CSR is significant at 5% level in column 
1-4 and significant at 1% level in column 3, and neither CSR nor REL is significant. Thus, it 
confirms our finding for hypothesis 1. The tests on hypothesis 2a and 2b provide further support.    
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
A large literature has examined the impact of managers’ religiosity on firm decisions, and we 
extend this line of research to the M&A area. Using a sample of domestic deals in the U.S. 
announced between 1996 and 2014, we find that the positive association between target CSR and 
M&A premium is stronger for acquirers headquartered in highly religious counties. While 
religious managers do not pay a higher premium for targets’ CSR strengths, they pay a lower 
premium for targets’ CSR concerns. The result supports our argument that religious managers, due 
to their more risk-averse personality, are more conscious with targets’ potential risks. 
One important policy implication is that religion may play a corporate governance role in M&A 
events. Literature has documented that managers’ over-confidence and empire-building tendency 
can be used to explain value-destroying M&A, while our finding suggests that religious managers 
are less likely to overpay risky targets, thus reducing the likelihood of a negative return for 
acquirers’ shareholders. This argument is also supported by the finding that firms located in more 
religious areas are less likely to receive a negative market reaction during their M&A 
announcement (Chintrakarn et al., 2016). Nevertheless, whether religion reduces agency problem 
is still unclear, as it is possible that religious managers may pass up risky targets that could create 
better synergy. Although this is beyond the scope of our study, future studies should look into the 
effect of managers’ religiosity on the choice of targets, and it would provide more insightful 
understandings on the role of religion in agency theory.  
As is the case with other studies, our study has several limitations. First, the sample size is small, 
and it may lead to a low explaining power of the regression models that we use. Second, due to 
the unavailability of an alternative CSR data set, we only use the MSCI data, so the result lacks 
robustness in terms of the measure of targets’ CSR performance. Third, our study does not consider 
the different effects associated with different CSR dimensions. However, we choose not to test 
individual CSR dimensions because the strength/concern score for a CSR dimension is based on 
various indicators, and as we cannot differentiate these indicators, the result of such tests would 
be difficult to interpret. Fourth, the proxy for managers’ religiosity is not a precise measure. 
Despite all the arguments we present, a person’s religiosity can still be irrelevant to the 
environment where he or she lives. Moreover, whether the ratio of total adherents over total 
population is an appropriate measure for county-level religiosity remains in doubt since it is based 
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on survey results, which might not be reliable. Therefore, due to these limitations, the result of this 
study must be interpreted with caution.   
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Appendix A: The Year Distribution and the Industry Distributions  
 
Year Freq. Percent Cum 
1996 7 1.50 1.50 
1997 6 1.28 2.78 
1998 19 4.07 6.85 
1999 19 4.07 10.92 
2000 10 2.14 13.06 
2001 2 0.43 13.49 
2002 6 1.28 14.78 
2003 5 1.07 15.85 
2004 42 8.99 24.84 
2005 59 12.63 37.47 
2006 50 10.71 48.18 
2007 56 11.99 60.17 
2008 25 5.35 65.52 
2009 39 8.35 73.88 
2010 34 7.28 81.16 
2011 22 4.71 85.87 
2012 31 6.64 92.51 
2013 29 6.21 98.72 
2014 6 1.28 100.00 
Total 467 100.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Acquirer Industry Freq. Percent Cum. 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 1 0.21 0.21 
Mining 32 6.85 7.07 
Construction 3 0.64 7.71 
Manufacturing 249 53.32 61.03 
Transportation and Communications 48 10.28 71.31 
Wholesale Trade 11 2.36 73.66 
Retail Trade 32 6.85 80.51 
Services 91 19.49 100.00 
Total 467 100.00  
 
Target Industry Freq. Percent Cum. 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 2 0.43 0.43 
Mining 31 6.64 7.07 
Construction 3 0.64 7.71 
Manufacturing 233 49.89 57.60 
Transportation and Communications 45 9.64 67.24 
Wholesale Trade 8 1.71 68.95 
Retail Trade 25 5.35 74.30 
Services 120 25.70 100.00 
Total 467 100.00  
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Appendix B: Variables Definitions 
 
Variables Description 
M&A premium The natural logarithm of purchase price to target stock price premium one 
week prior to the announcement 
CSR The target's net CSR score calculated by total strengths minus total concerns 
TS The target’s total strengths score of the six CSR dimensions including 
environment, community, diversity, product, employee relationship, and 
human rights 
TC The target’s total concerns score of the six CSR dimensions including 
environment, community, diversity, product, employee relationship, and 
human rights 
Religiosity The religiosity of the county where the acquirer is headquartered 
REL Dummy variable "1" indicates that the religiosity is in the fourth quartile of the 
sample 
REL*CSR The interaction of REL and CSR 
REL*TS The interaction of REL and TS 
REL*TC  The interaction of REL and TC 
other bidder Dummy variable "1" indicates that there was more than one bidder 
cash offer Dummy variable "1" indicates that the deal is entirely in cash 
tender offer Dummy variable "1" indicates that the deal is tender offer 
hostile bid Dummy variable "1" indicates that the deal is unsolicited 
toehold Dummy variable "1" indicates that the acquirer held more than 5% of the 
target’s ownership before the deal 
deal value The natural logarithm of the transaction value in millions 
acquirer size The natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets in millions 
acquirer FCF The acquirer’s free cash flow calculated by EBITDA in millions divided by total 
assets in millions 
target m/b The target's market to book ratio 
target FCF The target's free cash flow calculated by EBITDA in millions divided by total 
assets in millions 
target leverage The target's total long-term debt in millions divided by total assets in millions 
target institutional The target’s ownership held by institutional investors before the deal 
 
 
